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ABSTRACT
KEY FACTORS DRIVING PERSONNEL DOWNSIZING IN MULTINATIONAL
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
Ilksen Gorkem
Old Dominion University, 2015
Co-Directors: Dr. Pilar Pazos
Dr. Resit Unal

Although downsizing has long been a topic o f research in traditional
organizations, there are very few studies o f this phenomenon in military contexts. As a
result, we have little understanding o f the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in
military settings. This study contributes to our understanding o f key factors that drive
personnel downsizing in military organizations and whether those factors may differ
across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The theoretical framework for this study was
built from studies in non-military contexts and adapted to fit the military environment.
This research relies on historical data from one o f the largest multinational
coalition forces worldwide. Time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data from 28
NATO countries over 23 years (1990-2012) were gathered. This data included the
following variables: Total Active Duty Personnel number, Military Expenditure as a
percentage o f GDP, turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and modification o f the
National Military Strategy Directive. This study measures personnel downsizing as a
reduction in Total Active Duty Personnel number in NATO nations’ military
organizations. A series o f analyses using the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) one-step difference method with robust standard errors were conducted
in two steps. For the first step, an inspection o f the key factors that drive personnel
downsizing was performed using Stata xtabond’ estimation. For the second step, an

analysis o f whether or not the key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters
was conducted.
The findings from this research contribute to the discipline o f engineering
management by providing a model to improve our understanding and ability to predict
future personnel downsizing decisions and to increase our understanding o f military
governance not only NATO wide but also worldwide. Differences found across cultural
clusters make this study more noteworthy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Although downsizing has been a topic o f research for many years, the literature
on downsizing is still developing. There are a few researchers trying to unlock the
mystery o f what drives downsizing in military organizations (Magan-Diaz & CespedesLorente, 2012). Several theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted to
investigate the causes o f this phenomenon in the academic realm (McKinley, Zhao, &
Rust, 2000). Useem (1993) investigated the factors that drive downsizing and found that
a change in leadership was associated to downsizing in personnel numbers. Likewise,
Budros (1999) investigated the causes o f downsizing. It was estimated that downsizing
rates were higher when CEOs had financial backgrounds than when they did not (Budros,
1999). Bemardi (1996) found that downsizing decisions are heavily affected by political
guidance.
Researchers have not yet agreed upon one definition for downsizing. Most
scholars define downsizing as structural, functional, and personnel reduction aimed at
improving the performance o f an organization (Cameron, 1994; Cascio, 1993; DeWitt,
1993; Freeman & Cameron, 1993; McKinley, Sanchez, & Schick, 1995). Prior research
has argued that an organization’s desired performance level is often accomplished
through personnel lay-offs (Cascio, 1993).
Armed forces around the world have gone through downsizing to increase
performance by reducing functions, changing the work process, or reducing the
hierarchical levels o f their organizations (Cameron, 1994; DeWitt, 1993; Freeman &
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Cameron, 1993). A number o f NATO countries began military downsizing at the end o f
World War II, and the majority o f them downsized after the Cold War (Borch & Wallace,
2010; The World Bank, 2014). After experiencing military downsizing during those
periods, it is believed that a number o f possible key factors that drive personnel
downsizing may vary across NATO nations' cultural clusters. As an international
alliance, NATO has 28 member nations which fall under different cultural clusters
(Chnokar, Brodbeck, & House, 2009). This makes NATO a very appropriate context for
studying the phenomenon o f personnel downsizing from a multinational and multicultural
perspective. The purpose o f this study is to investigate key factors that drive personnel
downsizing in NATO nations' military organizations (armed forces) and to determine
whether those factors may differ across cultural clusters based on quantitative analysis o f
the data.
1.1

Background of the Problem
Changes in the external environment o f military organizations drive the need for

organizational change and often result in downsizing (James, 2008). A number o f NATO
nations’ armed forces have been downsizing for several decades. For instance, Canada’s
number o f active military personnel went from 88,000 in 1989 to 69,950 in 1999 and
65,700 by the end o f 2010. France’s numbers were reduced from 554,000 in 1989 to
332,250 in 2011 (The World Bank, 2014). It appears that there are certain key factors that
drive personnel downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations.
1.2

Problem Statement
It is critical for a military organization to provide an efficient workforce while

optimizing personnel numbers. It is also imperative to understand that the problem o f
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balancing resources and requirements is a big challenge (DAU, 2014). Scholars provide
evidence o f a relationship between an organization’s budget (expenditure) and personnel
downsizing (Prindle, 2005). The dynamics o f downsizing affect all nations worldwide,
and multinational coalitions such as NATO are critically affected by downsizing
decisions at the national level (The World Bank, 2014). The U.S. defense budget for 2012
was $645.7 billion, and military personnel spending made up 22% ($141.8 billion) o f
total spending (DoD, 2013c). The U.S. military personnel spending was more than
China’s total defense budget ($102.4 billion) and twice Russia’s total ($59.9 billion)
(Heeley, 2013).
Although scholars have investigated some o f the factors that drive downsizing in
organizations, a systematic literature search did not yield any research study exploring
the contextual factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations
(Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Beaulier, Hall, & Lynch, 2011; Brannen, 2005; Budros,
1999; Cameron & Freeman, 1994 ; Cascio, 1993; Franko, 1994; Magan-Dlaz &
Cespedes-Lorente, 2012; Useem, 1993). There are very few studies in military contexts,
and those that exist generally examine the effects o f downsizing in military organizations
(Cascio, Young, & Morris, 1997; Castro, 2013; Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, & Pandey, 2010;
DeWitt, 1993; Lewis, 2013; Prindle, 2005; Sronce, 2003). As a result, we have little
understanding o f the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military settings and
whether those factors differ across cultural clusters. The theoretical framework for this
study was built on studies conducted in non-military contexts and then adapted to
characteristics o f the military environment. This research proposes a model to identify the
key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations.
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1.3

Purpose Statement
The purpose o f this quantitative study is to investigate key factors that might drive

personnel downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations and whether those
factors may differ across cultural clusters. For the purpose o f this study, the definition o f
downsizing is limited to personnel downsizing in the military organizations o f 28 NATO
nations. Any reduction in Total Active Duty Personnel o f a nation was considered
personnel downsizing.
The quantitative correlational research design was selected because it allows the
researcher to study the relationship between possible key factors and active duty
personnel downsizing across multicultural military organizations. The purpose o f the
research design is to determine to what extent the independent variables (Military
Expenditure, turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and modification o f the National
Military Strategy Directive) predict the dependent variable (Total Active Duty Personnel
number).
1.4

Research Questions
The questions for this descriptive research are stated below:

Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military
organizations o f NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
1.5

Conceptual Framework
The conceptual model based on the literature review is shown in Figure 1. The

model was constructed to investigate the relationship between Personnel Downsizing (Y)
and Military Expenditure (Xi), turnover in the Chief o f General Staff (X 2 ), and
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modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive (X 3 ). It was also constructed to
determine whether those relationships differ across NATO nations' cultural clusters.
Y = f ( X , , X 2, X 3)
where (Y) is personnel downsizing in military organizations, (Xi) is Military
Expenditure, (X 2 ) is turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and (X 3) is modification o f the
National Military Strategy Directive.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model

1.6

Operational Definitions
Operational definitions used throughout this study are provided below:
•

Downsizing: This study defines downsizing as a percentage o f active duty
personnel reduction in the military organizations o f 28 NATO nations
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within a given period. Any reduction in the number o f Total Active Duty
Personnel qualifies as personnel downsizing.
•

Total Active Duty Personnel: Total Active Duty Personnel is the total
number o f personnel in a given national military organization (armed
forces) within NATO. The number includes only those that have a “full
time occupation as part o f a military organization, including paramilitary
forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they
may be used to support or replace regular military forces" (The World
Bank, 2014, p. 1).

•

Military Expenditure (% of GDP): “Military Expenditure is all costs
incurred as a result o f current military activities o f a NATO nation"
(S1PRI, 2014, p. 1). Military Expenditure is the percentage o f GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) o f each NATO nation.

•

Chief o f General Staff: The Chief o f General Staff is the person in
command/lead o f all the forces in a NATO nation’s military organization
(DoD, 2010).

•

Turnover in Chief o f General Staff: Turnover in the Chief o f General
Staff is the year when transfer o f authority takes place from the current
Chief o f General Staff to his/her successor.

•

Tenure o f Chief of General Staff: Tenure o f the Chief o f General Staff is
the number o f years that the Chief o f General Staff has been on duty.

•

National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD): The National Military
Strategy Directive is an official document used for allocating military
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power to reach a level o f ambition directed by a national security strategy
(DoD, 2010). NMSD is published periodically by each nation in the
coalition. Publication frequency differs across NATO nations (e.g.
annually, bi-annually, etc.).
•

Modification o f National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD):
Modification o f NMSD stands for the year when a newer version of
NMSD is published.

•

National Military Strategy Directive Maturity: National Military
Strategy Directive maturity is the period o f time that the NMSD has been
in effect.

•

Cultural Clusters: Cultural cluster is a group o f countries with similar
cultural characteristics (House, 2004; Russo, 2000). In this study, 28
NATO countries are grouped according to their cultural clusters.

•

Military Organization: Military organizations in this study include the
Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard (DoD, 2010).
Military organizational structure may change from nation to nation. The
term 'M ilitary Organization’ is synonymous with the term ‘armed forces,’
and it includes organizations from each o f the 28 NATO nations.

•

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international
alliance that consists o f 28 member states from North America and Europe
founded in 1949. These member states include the twelve founding
members o f the alliance: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
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Kingdom, and the United States (NATO, 2013, August 20). The remaining
members and their membership dates are: “Greece-Turkey (1952),
Germany (1955), Spain (1982), the Czech Republic-Hungary-Poland
(1999), Bulgaria-Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania-Romania-Slovakia-Slovenia
(2004) and Albania-Croatia (2009)” (NATO, 2013, August 20, p. 1).
•

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Gross domestic product (GDP) is
defined as the overall market value o f all the final goods and services
produced by a nation within a given year (Argandona, 2008, p. 1043).

•

Y ear: Data collected for this study was acquired from 28 NATO countries
from 1990 through 2012 (for a total span o f 23 years).

1.7

Assumptions
The data gathered for this study reflects the true value for NATO nations’ military

organizations. The modified cultural clusters o f NATO nations reflect reality. This study
assumes that the data collected is accurate. Several sources were utilized for triangulation
with the aim to reduce possible errors in data sources.
1.8

Significance o f the Study
There are very few published studies o f military downsizing, and no prior studies

were found that investigate the key factors that might drive personnel downsizing in
NATO nations’ military organizations and whether those factors may differ across
NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The findings contribute to engineering management and
military governance by providing a model to help leadership in military coalitions
understand the critical factors driving strategic human resource decisions. This study is a
unique example in military settings that provides a new perspective to military
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downsizing. Coalition forces rely on resources from all partnering organizations to
accomplish their mission. Human resource management decisions made by each partner
have implications for the rest o f the coalition. Those decisions are often driven by
different factors. In particular, characteristics o f the national culture are known to affect
the decision making process. This study specifically explores the role that national
culture characteristics play on personnel downsizing decisions and whether the factors
driving those decisions might differ across cultural clusters. This study makes a
significant contribution to our understanding o f strategic human resource management in
multinational military settings by identifying the most significant antecedents of
downsizing.
1.9

Reduction o f Gaps
Although some researchers have studied downsizing and its effects on military

organizations, there is still a gap in the literature concerning the factors that drive
personnel downsizing in military organizations. A systematic review o f the literature did
not yield any published studies addressing this topic. There could be unpublished studies
that address this subject, but no previous research was found in the form o f scholarly
publications or publicly shared documents. Therefore, a gap remains unfilled in this area.
In addition, there is no previous study on how influential factors may differ across NATO
nations’ cultural clusters. This study reduces the gaps in this area o f study by identifying
and examining the factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations and
whether those factors may differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Definition o f Downsizing
Downsizing is sometimes used as a synonym for decline, but they are two

different terms. Downsizing is typically aimed at improving efficiency while a decline
typically is naturally occurring and has no aim o f improving efficiency. Decline is the
result o f a combination o f organizational factors and environment (Freeman & Cameron,
1993). Downsizing may be performed by reducing functions, changing the work process,
or reducing hierarchal levels without reducing the total number o f personnel (Cameron,
1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993). Downsizing is a set o f managerial actions aimed at
producing a more efficient, productive, and competitive organization. It may be executed
by reducing workers (Cameron, 1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993). According to Cascio
(1993) “downsizing is a popular strategy” (p. 97). It is also a managerial reduction in
resources, including human power, to realign and increase the performance level o f an
organization when it faces a decline in performance (DeWitt, 1993). Downsizing is aimed
at gaining economic and organizational benefits (Cascio, 1993; McKinley et al., 1995). It
is a tool used by many organizations to remain competitive (McCune, Beatty, &
Montagno, 1988). This method results in increased productivity while at the same time
utilizing fewer funds. Downsizing aims to be more productive by reducing cost via
performing Total Quality Management techniques such as reengineering the logistics
process. In this content, the logistics system o f an organization is inspected, and costincreasing sub-phases are omitted by reengineering to reduce overall logistics related cost

(Thomchick, Young, & Grenoble, 1999). Downsizing is a firm 's reaction to a changing
business environment (Thomchick et al., 1999). It is an intentional action executed
proactively, reactively or creatively (Cameron, 1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Mishra
& Mishra, 1994). Downsizing is a radical change in an organization since it may also
change the processes or activities employees were accustomed to (Budros, 1999).
Downsizing means not only a reduction in resources, including the total number
o f employees but also a redesigning and restructuring o f an organization to be more
effective and productive. For many companies, downsizing means a reduction in
personnel quantity rather than a systemic organizational redesign and may include a
modification o f the organization to improve its efficiency (Cascio, 1993). During the
period from 1989 through 1991, around 1,000 American companies eliminated 212,598
jobs reportedly saving

$8

billion per year (Cascio, 1993). It is likely that downsizing will

continue in American companies in the foreseeable future (Hanaoka, 1997).
Downsizing is not without consequences. The findings o f a research study
conducted among Fortune 100 companies that downsized between 1987 and 1998
showed that downsized companies were worse in economic performance than the
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companies that did not downsize (De Meuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden, & Roraff, 2004).
Consequently, after a downsizing action, the remaining personnel must assume the
responsibilities o f the personnel that were let go, which generally leads to overload
(Prindle, 2005). The effects and consequences o f downsizing are out o f the scope o f this
study.
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2.2

Military Downsizing
With the understanding that military organizations can become more effective and

productive, it is possible for downsizing to be implemented in almost the same manner in
military as in non-military organizations. Downsizing approaches are thought to increase
performance by reducing functions, changing the work process, or reducing the
hierarchical levels o f a military organization (Cameron, 1994; DeWitt, 1993; Freeman &
Cameron, 1993). Military downsizing is largely driven by changes in the security
environment (Thomchick et al., 1999). After World War II, the United States Army
downsized from 8,267,958 to 1,070,000 by m id-1947 (Taylor, Olson, & Schrader, 1981).
As a reaction to the changing security environment during the Cold War, the United
States’ total active duty personnel number reached 1,459,000 in 1950. During the Korean
War (June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953), in which the United States was involved, the number
o f active duty personnel reached 3,636,000 in 1952 (Daggett & Belasco, 2002). During
the period following the Korean War, the United States armed forces downsized to
2,600,000 by 1958. Although the aforementioned examples are referring to military
downsizing as personnel downsizing, there are other examples o f restructuring efforts in
military organizations. For instance, the U.S. Department o f Defense (DoD) closed more
than 60 bases during the 1960s (Beaulier et al., 2011). During the period from 1988 to
2001, the U.S. Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) closed 125 major
military facilities, 225 minor facilities, and then realigned 145 other bases (Beaulier et al.,
2011). Due to these closures, 15,874 civil service employees would have been fired, but
by implementing several types o f transition programs (Job Placement Programs, the
Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments,
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Transfer o f Function, etc.) fewer employees were affected by the BRAC program (Brass,
2006). Turkey inactivated four o f its Army Brigades in 2004 (Gurel, 2004). Starting in
2011, Germany reorganized its military organization into response forces and
stabilization/support forces to be able to manage the need to be more deployable
(Business Monitor International, 2011).
Military downsizing is a strategic redesign to adapt to a changing security
environment aimed at increasing readiness for foreseeable missions, optimizing the entire
organization, and increasing performance levels by reducing personnel numbers, bases,
facilities, or by enhancing the hierarchical organization, the work process, equipment,
and weapon systems (Cameron, 1994; Cameron & Freeman, 1994 ; Cascio, 1993;
McCune et al., 1988; McKinley et al., 1995; Thomchick et al., 1999).
2.3

Downsizing Theory
There are three theoretical perspectives on downsizing: the economic, the

institutional, and the sociocognitive, as shown in Table 1 (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229).
The economic theory states that economic reasons drive downsizing, while the
institutional theory suggests that sociological reasons are responsible for downsizing. The
sociocognitive theory posits that managerial decisions are the major driving forces behind
downsizing decisions. Each theory describes the phenomenon o f downsizing from a
different perspective and identifies the key factors influencing it.
2.3.1

The Economic Theory
The key assumptions o f the economic perspective are that “firms are rational,

self-interest seeking, and efficiency driven. Managerial actions and their outcomes are
tightly connected, and managers understand those connections” (McKinley et al., 2000, p.
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229). The economic theory states that the need to be more productive and efficient results
in downsizing (Freeman & Cameron, 1993).

Table 1. Theories on Organizational Downsizing [Adapted from (McKinley et al.,
2000, p. 229)1

Key
Assumptions

Major
Arguments

2.3.2

Economic
Perspective
Firms are rational,
self-interest
seeking, and
efficiency driven.
Managerial actions
and their outcomes
are tightly
connected, and
managers
understand those
connections.

Firms downsize in
order to reduce
costs and improve
efficiency and
profitability.

Institutional
Perspective
Organizational change
arises from conformity
to institutional rules, as
well as from an internal
impetus for efficiency.
Managerial actions and
their outcomes are
loosely connected, and
managers experience
uncertainty about those
connections.
Firms downsize in order
to gain legitimacy and
reduce uncertainty.
Downsizing is driven
by coercive, mimetic,
and normative
isomorphism.

Sociocognitive
Perspective
Boundedly rational
managers impose
schemas on information
environments.
Managers make
decisions based on
those schemas, which
often become reified
through social
construction processes.
Managers' decisions to
downsize are based on
shared mental models
that define downsizing
as effective. These
mental models are
social interaction and
connected enactment
processes.____________

The Institutional Theory
Researchers in opposition to the economic theory think that the needs originating

from social life drive downsizing. They call this perspective the institutional theory
(DiMaggio & Powell, 2003). They refer to it as “coercive isomorphism,'’ (p. 157) which
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means managers see downsizing decisions as their legitimate rights. In this theory, career
rewards and professional interaction drive downsizing (McKinley et al., 1995). The
institutional theory supposes that society considers downsizing an institutional norm that
leads them to downsize in order to achieve so-called legitimacy (Magan-Diaz &
Cespedes-Lorente, 2012).
The key assumptions o f the institutional perspective are that “organizational
change arises from conformity to institutional rules as well as an internal impetus for
efficiency. Managerial actions and their outcomes are loosely connected, and managers
experience uncertainty about those connections” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229).
According to the institutional theory, “firms downsize in order to gain legitimacy and
reduce uncertainty. Downsizing is driven by coercive, mimetic, and normative
isomorphism” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229).
2.3,3

The Sociocognitive Theory
The key assumptions o f the Sociocognitive Perspective are that “boundedly

rational managers impose schemas on information environments. Managers make
decisions based on those schemas, which often become reified through social
construction processes” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229). According to the Sociocognitive
Theory, “managers’ decisions to downsize are based on shared mental models that define
downsizing as effective. These mental models are social interaction and connected
enactment processes” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229). The sociocognitive perspective
focuses attention on managerial mental models. Based on this theory socially constructed
shared schemas emerge among managers leading them to believe that downsizing will
lead them to better economic performance (McKinley et al., 2000). They choose to
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downsize because they believe that this strategy will be successful. In addition, cultural
diversity may affect organizations, since organizations might have managers from
different cultures (O'Neill, Pouder, & Buchholtz, 1998).
2.3.4

Other Theories
There are a number o f more recent theoretical studies in the downsizing literature

such as the Resources Theory, which suggests that changes in resources (budget, human
power, etc.) lead to downsizing (Fisher & White, 2000). According to another theory
called the Agency Theory, downsizing is heavily affected by “industry-specific factors
and downsizing is positively associated with outside, non-institutional shareholding”
(Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000, p. 300). Finally, Bhattacharyya and Chatterjee
(2005) classified the reasons behind organizational downsizing by looking at it from
different perspectives, including “economic, institutional, strategic, ideological, and
arational perspectives” (p. 65).
2.4

Military Structures
The ever-changing security environment o f the world is requiring new kinds of

missions and new military organizations to fulfill these new requirements (Krepinevich,
1996). With this in mind, almost every NATO nation possesses a military structure to
execute missions that need to adapt to fulfill a dynamic purpose. For instance, the
structure o f the U.S. Department o f Defense (DoD) is approximately a combination o f the
Office o f the Secretary o f Defense, the Department o f the Army, the Department o f the
Navy (The Navy, The Marine Corps), the Department o f the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs
o f Staff, and nine Combatant Commands. The Secretary o f Defense is the head o f the
DoD while the Secretaries o f the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force function as
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senior leaders for those organizations (DoD, 2014). Therefore, in the United States,
politicians and civilians are heavily involved in the organizational structure and decision
making process.
The Turkish military has a different structure directed by generals rather than by
politicians and/or civilians. There is no civilian senior leader in the Turkish General Staff.
The General acts as the chief o f the Turkish armed forces and reports directly to the
Prime Minister rather than the Secretary o f Defense. Under the command o f the Turkish
General Staff, there are the Army, the Navy, the Air, the Gendarmerie, and the
Coastguard commandants (Turkish Armed Forces, 2014, May 22).
The German Federal Defense is a combination o f two parts, which are military
and civilian. A general commands the military branch (the General is also the chief of
staff and the military advisor to the government), which consists o f the Army, the Navy,
the Air Force, the Joint Support Service, and the Joint Medical Service. The Federal
Minister o f Defense leads the civilian branch and also acts as the commander-in-chief of
the German armed forces (Bundeswehr, 2011).
As an example o f the detailed organizational structure o f a military organization,
a diagram o f the U.S. Army operational unit is illustrated in Figure 2.

(3 / Brigadier OaeraW 'olonrl)

(3 or more / Lknteaaat CoionriMajor)

Figure 2. The U.S. Army Organizational Structure [Adapted from (US Army, 2014)]

A general (four star / ★ ★ ★ ★) commands a field army, which consists o f two to
five corps. A lieutenant general (★ ★ ★) commands a corps, which consists o f two to five
divisions. A major general (★ ★) commands a division, which consists o f three brigades
(10,000-18,000 soldiers). A brigadier general (★)/colonel commands a brigade, which
consists o f three or more battalions (3,000-5,000 soldiers). A lieutenant colonel/major
commands a battalion, which consists o f three to five companies (500-600 soldiers). A
captain commands a company, which consists o f three to four platoons (100-200
soldiers). A first lieutenant/lieutenant commands a platoon, which consists o f three to
four squads (16-40 soldiers). A staff sergeant commands a squad, which has four to ten
soldiers (US Army, 2014).
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2.5

Defense Planning
Military organizations must decide on the right design concerning missions,

structure, budget, personnel, and all other resources. A NATO member nation's armed
forces use many different kinds o f defense systems. For example, the United States'
weapon systems are classified into 12 main branches: space systems, aircraft, land
systems, ships, smart weapons, aircraft systems, dumb bombs, naval combat systems,
missiles, nuclear systems, missile defense, and intelligence systems. Each branch has
many different sub-branches. For instance, Land Warfare Systems consists o f direct fire,
indirect fire, command, combat support, and combat service support sub-branches. Sub
branches are separated by the specifications o f the systems, which include tracked,
wheeled, towed, crew served, individual, munitions, defense/countermeasures,
communications, command, control, intelligence, and other equipment. Finally, they are
labeled by names such as Ml Abrams tank, M998 Truck-HMMWV (High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle), M l 15 (8 in / 203 mm) howitzer, FIM-92A stinger
weapons systems, M12A2 5.56 mm semiautomatic rifle, hand grenades, uniforms,
radiological defense systems, joint tactical radio system, and MRE (Meal, Ready to Eat,
Individual) (Federation o f American Scientists, 2014). As in land systems, aircraft and
aircraft systems, as well as navy and all other warfare systems, have sub-branches down
to the system names. Some o f the United States’ aircraft warfare systems are: A-10A, F15C, F-16C, B-52H, C-130H, and HH-60G.
All warfare systems are subject to the effects o f aging, and they need to be
replaced by newer models by using military funds. Some o f the United States’ aircraft
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with average ages between 18.2 (HH-60G) and 46.7 years (B-52H) needed to be replaced
(Data as o f 30 August 2008) (Coggins, 2010).
Military organizations, along with their organizational structures and defense
systems, are located on bases and other facilities. The U.S. military has almost 550,000
buildings and facilities that support its operations and combat readiness (Miles, 2013).
The U.S. DoD announced the closing o f 21 minor or non-operational military facilities in
Europe hoping to save $60 million annually (Tilghman, 2014, May 23). Buildings and
facilities also age, and they need to be replaced or renovated via the military budget.
2.6

Military Expenditure
Keeping combat ready military organizations for a nation is an expensive

necessity. Nations are training their militaries to protect their population, homeland,
resources, and their national honor. In order to be able to execute the aforementioned
missions, governments allocate money as part o f their defense budgets or military
expenditures (Coggins, 2010). There is no agreed international definition for military
expenditure. According to Heeley (2013), world nations spent approximately $1,582.8
billion ($1.58 trillion) in 2012 as military expenditure. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2013), world military spending in 2012
was estimated to be $1,756 billion. The U.S. defense budget for 2012 was $645.7 billion
(4.12% o f its GDP), which was two times more than all o f the countries in Asia, six times
more than China (1.24% o f its GDP), and 11 times more than Russia (3.06% o f its GDP).
The U.S. accounted for 41% o f worldwide military spending. On the other hand, Iraq
spent 11.28% o f its GDP, which was $14.7 billion, and Afghanistan spent 10.54% o f its
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GDP ($2.1 billion) while some NATO nations spent less. For example, Canada spent
only 1.04%, Italy spent 1.19%, and Germany spent 1.20% o f their GDPs (Heeley, 2013).
National instabilities may have an effect on military expenditures. The United
States military expenditure remarkably increased during the Korean War, the Vietnam
War, and the First G ulf War (Coggins, 2010). However, the possible effects o f national
instability periods on the data were out o f the scope o f this study.
With so many requirements and missions, defense budgets need to be allocated
efficiently. The U.S. defense budget allocation for 2012 is shown in Table 2. The defense
budget must be allocated to military personnel spending, operation, maintenance,
procurement, research, development, military construction, family housing, testing,
evaluation, etc. Operation and maintenance together with military personnel spending
make up more than half (52.5%) o f total spending.
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Table 2. The U.S. DoD FY2012 Defense Budget Allocation [Adapted from (DoD,
2013c)]
US DoD FY2012 Spending:
Discretionary Base Budget Authority

In Million
Dollars

Percent

Military Personnel

141,819
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Operation and Maintenance

197,198

30.5

Procurement

104,464

16.2

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

71,375

11.1

Military Construction

11,367

1.8

Family Housing

1,683

0.3

Revolving and Management Funds

2,641

0.4

Subtotal, Discretionary base budget authority

530,547

82.2

Discretionary Cap Adjustment / Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO)

115,083

17.8

Total, Discretionary budget authority (Base and
OCO)

645,630

(% )

It is difficult to decide how to allocate a defense budget. A model for the defense
budget allocation process is illustrated in Figure 3. Ammunition, fuel, and contracted
services are considered disposable; warfare systems, infrastructures, and
research/development/testing/evaluation are considered an investment. The main goal o f
allocation is to maximize military capabilities by considering budget constraints and
expenditures in order to maintain a military strength that is capable o f executing current
and foreseeable missions (Stone, 2004).
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CONSTRAINT

EXPENDITURES

INPUTS

FORCES

OUTPUTS

Figure 3. Defense Budget Allocation Process [Adapted from (Stone, 2004, p. 126)]

Keeping in mind that U.S. operation, maintenance, and personnel spending are
52.5% o f total spending, allocation must be optimized in order to have a modernized and
mission-ready military power. If a military budget is not enough to reach the desired
capabilities, which is also called the ’Level o f Ambition’ in military terms, then a
reduction in personnel, investment, operations and maintenance expenditures may be
needed. One o f the ways to reduce expenditures is through downsizing. The U.S. DoD
estimated a savings o f $200 billion between FY2012 and FY2017 by “paring back excess
staff, headquarters structures (including a 4-star ‘combatant command'), General and
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Flag Officers, senior civilian executives, and duplication in information technology,
intelligence, public affairs, and facilities” (DoD, 2013a, p. 2). The U.S. DoD planned to
save $1.9 billion by cancelling ‘the precision tracking space sensor’ in FY2014. They
also estimated that if the sequestration continues as planned, they would save $50 billion
each year through FY2021 (DoD, 2013a). The U.S. DoD saved $17 billion by closing
125 major and 225 minor military facilities from 1988 to 2001 (Beaulier et al., 2011).
2.7

Chief o f General Staff
The Chief of General Staff is the person in overall command o f all forces in a

NATO nation’s military organization (DoD, 2010). NATO countries have different
command structures, but almost every nation has a commander who leads its armed
forces or national military organization. Turkey uses the title the chief o f general staff
(Turkish Armed Forces, 2014, May 22), the U.S. uses the title chairman o f the joint
chiefs o f staff (Feickert, 2014), Germany uses the title chief o f federal armed forces staff
or general inspector o f the Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr, 2011), and France uses the title
chief o f the defence staff (French MOD, 2013). In Latvia, the chief o f defense leads the
armed forces (DCAF, 2003). There is no common name for the aforementioned top
commanders, but in this study, the term ‘chief o f general staff is used to refer to the
highest-ranking officer o f a nation’s armed forces. The chief o f general staff makes
strategic decisions for redesign/restructuring during his/her tenure. His/her critical role
changes from nation to nation. The Turkish C hief o f General Staff, General Yasar
Buyukanit (2006-2008), announced in 2006 that the Turkish land forces would gradually
shrink by 20-30% as a part o f a strategic force plan called Kuvvet-2014 (Force-2014).
Kuvvet-2014 successfully began its execution by disbanding the 15th Corps (Hurriyet
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Daily News, 2006). Nevertheless, during the command o f his successors, the
implementation o f the plan had lost its momentum. The U.S. Chairman o f the Joint
Chiefs o f Staff from 1993 to 1997, General John Shalikashvili, established the ‘Joint
Vision 2010’ transformation program, which aimed to increase the effectiveness o f the
digitalization o f the U.S. military (Shalikashvili, 1997). The U.S. Chairman o f the Joint
Chiefs o f Staff from 2007 to 2011, Admiral Michael Glenn Mullen, stated his views on
the use o f military force in a speech at Kansas University (Chu-Jeff, 2010, May 1).
According to the economic and sociocognitive perspectives o f downsizing, managers
play a prominent role in downsizing decisions (McKinley, 2000). As a result,
replacement o f top military leadership is expected to have a significant impact on
downsizing. This research examines whether changes in the C hief o f General Staff might
be a factor that drives downsizing in military organizations.
2.8

National Military Strategy Directive
The National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD) is an official paper for

distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national
defense strategy objectives (DoD, 2010). It is often used to turn the National Security
Strategy into a directive from which the armed forces could develop their defense
program including redesigning, enhancing, digitizing, and modernizing (Fast, 2010). The
NMSD is published periodically. Publication periods across NATO countries differ from
nation to nation (e.g. annually, bi-annually and so on). The NMSD generally describes
the security environment while outlining details regarding what the armed forces should
do to accomplish their mission in that environment. It also defines military capabilities
and the means necessary to reach those capabilities (DoD, 2010). The U.S. National
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Military Strategy is reviewed February 15th o f every even-numbered year (US GAO,
1993). The national military strategy directives lead the way in restructuring, which may
end in downsizing decisions. The U.S. national military strategy directive that was
published in 1997 directed the U.S. forces to begin a transformation process to be more
capable and flexible (Metz, 2006). Norway changes its national military strategy every
four years (Global Security, 2014c). Modification to the National Military Strategy
Directives might be a factor that drives downsizing in military organizations.
2,9

Total Active Duty Personnel
Total Active Duty Personnel is the total number o f personnel in the armed forces

o f a nation who have “full-time occupation as part o f a military organization, including
paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may
be used to support or replace regular military forces” (The World Bank, 2014, p. 1). The
number o f Active Duty Military Personnel determines how much a government should
pay out o f its military budget for military personnel. In 2007, the U.S. active duty
military personnel cost 23% o f the defense budget with a total o f $96,761 billion spent
(Peccia, 2008). In 2012, it was 22% with a total o f $141,819 billion (DoD, 2013c). Some
o f the active duty personnel expenditures are for social security, Medicare, Medicaid, etc.
(Peccia, 2008). This takes into consideration that high cost military organizations
frequently reduce the number o f active duty personnel. The U.S. Army reduced its
personnel number from 790,000 to 520,000 from 1990 through 1995; this reduction
included officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and junior enlisted soldiers
(Evans, 1995). Germany reduced its active duty personnel from around 250,000 to
180,000 in 2010 (Business Monitor International, 2011).
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2.10

Needs for Downsizing
In 2013, the U.S. Congress prompted the military to reduce military expenditures

over the next 10 years with the potential for further cuts in the future (Blechman &
Eaglen, 2013). When an organization begins downsizing, it may continue for many years.
For instance, Kodak redesigned its structure four times in 10 years, Honeywell downsized
two times in four years, and many other major companies acted similarly through the
1990s (Cascio, 1993). Environmental factors are major drivers o f organizational change
often leading to redesign and downsizing initiatives (James, 2008). If the goal o f an
organization is to increase its efficiency and competitiveness, it will shrink the level o f
managerial structures to try to be more productive with fewer resources, and the
organization often performs downsizing to achieve this goal (Gandolfi, 2014). Some
firms prefer to downsize to reduce cost and to gain economic efficiency (Magan-Diaz &
Cespedes-Lorente, 2012). Sometimes a change in market conditions, such as a reduced
customer demand for certain products, might lead to personnel downsizing (Conway,
2004). Surprisingly, personnel downsizing has been performed by firms in a healthy
state, such as Frito Lay and GTE, in addition to firms in a fragile state, such as General
Motors and IBM (Bruton, Keels, & Shook, 1996). Preemptive strategic thinking might
also result in personnel downsizing in organizations even if such companies are at their
economic peaks (Budros, 2000).
In non-military contexts, causes o f personnel downsizing can also be categorized
as external (macro-environmental factors) and internal (organizational factors). In order
to identify potential key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military settings, the
factors in civilian contexts were used and adapted to military settings. The last columns
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o f Table 3 and Table 4, state the possible military key factors derived from Cooper,
Pandey, & Quick’s (2012) study. External factors o f personnel downsizing and possible
external military key factors are shown in Table 3.

29

Table 3. External Factors o f Personnel Downsizing and Possible External Military
Key Factors [Adapted from (Cooper et al., 2012, p. 66)J
External - Civilian
Factors

External - Military Factors

Possible External Military
Key Factors

Declines in customer
demands

Declines in level o f ambition

National Military Strategy
Directive

Industry deregulation /
privatization

Anticipated changes in the
security environment

National Military Strategy
Directive

Anticipated changes in
the economic
environment

Anticipated changes in military
expenditure

Military Expenditure

Downsizing among
competitors (cloning
response)

Successful downsizing among
other NATO nations

Imitating successful
examples

Abandonment o f
institutionalized
practices

Abandonment o f
institutionalized practices

National Military Strategy
Directive

Globalization / global
competition

Changes in the security
environment

National Military Strategy
Directive

Differences in regional
labor costs

Differences among NATO
nations’ cultural clusters,
differences in costs

Military Expenditure
(Factors may differ across
cultural clusters)

Industry conditions

Having modem equipment,
facilities, information
technologies

Modernization

Workforce
demographics

Differences among NATO
nation’s cultural clusters

N /A

Investments in
technology

Using information technology
in office works, modernization,
buying new warfare systems

Material (Modernization,
New Warfare Systems and
Information Technologies)
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Internal factors o f personnel downsizing and possible internal military key factors and
internal factors are displayed in Table 4.

Table 4. Internal Factors o f Personnel Downsizing and Possible Internal Military
Key Factors [Adapted from (Cooper et al., 2012, p. 66)]
Internal - Civilian
Factors

Internal - Military Factors

Possible Internal Military
Key Factors

Horizontal mergers /
acquisitions

Structural, hierarchical order
acquisitions o f military
organization

Organization (Structure /
Hierarchy o f a Military
Organization)

Corporate
governance
practices

Corporate governance practices

Military Expenditure

CEO demographic
characteristics

Chief o f General Staff
demographic characteristics

C hief o f General S ta ff

Human resources
practices

Active Duty Personnel
practices

N / A (Related to Total Active
Duty Personnel)

2.11

Downsizing Decisions and Roles
Downsizing typically consists o f a top-down driven set o f managerial actions

(Cameron, 1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993). However, it has been observed that
interventions are more effective when lower and mid-level employees are involved in the
implementation initiative (Cameron, 1994). Downsizing decisions are affected by
environmental (external) and organizational (internal) factors (Datta et al., 2010).
Building consensus on downsizing decisions with stakeholders is important (Pratzel &
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Morton, 2009). However, downsizing decisions are generally unilateral and stand on the
shoulder o f the leaders, managers, CEOs, or Chiefs o f General Staff (Prindle, 2005).
According to Gardner (2002), “budgets and politics have directly contributed to
downsizing decisions o f the Post-Cold War period’*(p. 41). In NATO nations’ armed
forces, the C hief o f General Staff is thought to play a key role in downsizing decisions.
The role o f the Chief o f General Staff might also have different prominence depending on
the country under consideration.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the U.S. National Security Strategy addresses the geo
political/geo-economic space o f the U.S. Government, and it considers national interests,
goals, and priorities (Hesterman, 2014). The U.S. National Defense Strategy outlines the
political military space from the perspective o f the U.S. Department o f Defense - for how
the United States will accomplish objectives.
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Figure 4. Linking National Security Strategy to National Military Strategy [Adapted
from (Hesterman, 2014, p. 3))

The U.S. national military strategy, prepared for military-operational space by the
U.S. armed forces, consists of national military objectives, missions, tasks and end states,
desired capabilities and attributes, priorities, strategic and military risk assessments and
regional assessments (Hesterman, 2014).
In the United States, Defense Planning/Programming Guidance (DPG) directs the
planning phase o f the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) Process
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(AcqNotes, 2014; DAU, 2014). The DPG is guided by the National Security Strategy, the
National Military Strategy, and the National Defense Strategy (AcpNotes, 2014). The
PPBE process declares how to distribute the resources o f the U.S. DoD (DAU, 2014). In
the planning phase, strategic priorities and capabilities are defined. In the programming
phase, priorities and capabilities are matched with the resources needed in order to
achieve the strategic priorities. During the budgeting phase, funding for the programs is
planned and justified, and an execution plan is created. In the execution phase, the
approved plan is implemented (AcqNotes, 2014; DAU, 2014).
In 2012, the United States spent 22% o f the U.S. DoD budget on military
personnel. Spending on operation and maintenance accounted for 30.5%, procurement
accounted for 16.2%, and research development/testing/evaluation accounted for 11.1%
(DoD, 2013c). The difficulty o f the decision regarding how to allocate the defense budget
in the armed forces has been largely acknowledged.
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Figure 5. Resource Balancing [Adapted from (AcqNotes, 2014, p. 19)]

As illustrated in Figure 5, being able to achieve the correct level o f resources, the
correct prioritization, and program tradeoffs with the correct amount o f risk can be
reached by balancing among and between manpower, investments, and military readiness
(AcqNotes, 2014). If there are not enough resources to reach the planned capabilities, a
cut-off point is needed in accordance with the priorities. Figure 6 illustrates the difficulty
o f allocating a budget while trying to decide courses o f action in the programming phase.
Since the budget is limited but requirements are not, the requirements need to be
prioritized in order to use the budget wisely. Prioritization o f the requirements and
alternative solutions are called courses o f action.
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Figure 6. From Programming to Budgeting [Adapted from (AcqNotes, 2014, p. 15)]
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Some possible courses o f action include: cancelling a warfare system project in
force application, force support, and battlespace awareness echelons; cancelling the
purchase o f newer fighter jets, tanks, warships, helicopters, etc.; cancelling planned
construction; and reducing the number o f Total Active Duty Personnel (AcqNotes, 2014).
Outputs to the programming phase are reconsidered for optimal budget planning.
A nation must perfectly align its requirements and match them with the available
resources based on the budget and national military strategy. If the military organization
o f a nation with shrinking economies continues to ask for a larger military budget, then
the nation’s economy may be severely damaged. For instance, during the mid-1980s,
Brazil increased its expenditures in military power despite a shrinking economy, resulting
in reduced economic growth (Franko, 1994).
According to previous studies, personnel downsizing is typically considered a
reduction in the number o f permanent employees o f five percent or more compared to the
previous year (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Cascio et al., 1997). In military
organizations, a reduction o f 5% can result in great vulnerability. The impact in terms of
actual reduction in personnel numbers can be huge in countries with a large military
force. For instance, in 2012 China had 2,993,000 active duty military personnel (5%
equals to 149,650), India had 2,728,700 (5% equals to 136,435), Russia had 1,364,000
(5% equals to 68,200), and the United States had 1,492,200 (5% equals to 74,610) (The
World Bank, 2014). In the same year, several NATO nations had fewer active duty
military personnel than 5% o f China’s total (149,650). For example, the Netherlands had
43,300, Belgium had 30,700, Czech Republic had 26,750, and Norway had 25,800 total
active duty personnel (The World Bank, 2014). For the purpose o f this study, any
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reduction in the number o f Total Active Duty Personnel is considered personnel
downsizing.
2.12

Key Factors That Drive Personnel Downsizing
Military downsizing is often used as a strategic redesign strategy in order to adapt

to a changing security environment. Downsizing decisions are typically aimed at
increasing readiness for foreseeable missions, optimizing the entire organization, and
increasing performance levels by reducing personnel numbers, bases, and facilities, or by
enhancing the hierarchical organization, the work process, equipment, and weapon
systems. The possible key factors that drive personnel downsizing were borrowed from
previous studies done in non-military contexts and adapted to fit a military environment.
2.12.1 Chief o f General Staff
The personality traits and backgrounds o f CEOs have been found to influence
downsizing in personnel numbers (Useem, 1993). It has been found that downsizing rates
were higher when CEOs had financial backgrounds than when they did not (Budros,
1999). Additionally, changes in top military management (Chiefs o f General Staff) might
also drive downsizing in military organizations depending on the leader’s personality,
background, and experience. In academic literature, it has been proposed that CEO
turnover may cause organizational dislocation and instability in personnel structure (Li,
2012). Thus, the Chief o f General Staff could be a key factor that drives personnel
downsizing in military organizations.
2.12.2 National Military Strategy Directive
The National Military Strategy Directive is linked to the national defense strategy
and the national security strategy (Hesterman, 2014). Any political guidance coming
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through that connection initiates action in real life during the years o f implementation. In
1993, the United States DoD defined its objective as diminishing its active duty force by
over 446,000 positions (US GAO, 1993): “By the end o f FY 1993, DoD expects to have
reduced its active duty force levels by over 446,000 positions, which is a reduction o f
nearly 21 percent over fiscal year 1987's end-strength levels” (US GAO, 1993, p. 0.4.1).
In 1994, a public law (No. 101-510) established in the United States directed a reduction
o f over 30% o f the United States’ military personnel by 1996 (Cameron, 1998). Based on
these examples, the National Military Strategy Directive could be another key factor.
2.12.3 Military Expenditure
In most cases, a military organization’s total personnel number, force structure,
equipment, and weapon systems directly affect military expenditure. For instance, in
1994, the United States estimated a savings o f 40% in military expenditure by reducing
over 30% o f its total active military personnel (Cameron, 1998). In military
organizations, a reduction in the defense budget generally results in downsizing. As
Figure 7 shows, the United States’ military expenditures fell from 5.32% to 3.02% o f its
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) from 1990 through 1999. During that same period, the
total number o f active duty personnel was reduced by 1.38% (from 2,180,000 to
1,575,000 personnel) (The World Bank, 2014). Thus, military expenditures are thought to
be a key factor driving personnel downsizing in military organizations.
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The U.S. Military Expenditure (1990-1999)
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Figure 7. The U.S. Military Expenditure (% o f GDP)

2.13

Other Possible Key Factors
There might be several other factors that drive personnel downsizing, but this

study attempts to determine only the most influential factors. Before analyzing other
possible key factors, it is important to know more about the military organization’s force
management model. Figure 8 depicts the Force Management Model.
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Figure 8. Force Management Model [Adapted from (Army Force Management
School, 2014)]

In order to meet requirements, solutions are created by using DOTMLPF tools,
namely Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities.
To be able to meet the requirements, one or more o f the solutions can be used. Possible
solutions are modifying doctrine modifying the structure or hierarchy o f the military
organization; training personnel; modernizing equipment by buying new warfare systems
or new IT; educating leaders; downsizing or upsizing the Total Active Duty Personnel
number; and closing, installing, or enhancing facilities or bases. The National Military
Strategy Directive and the Chief o f General Staff can directly influence requirements.
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Some requirements may also be created through implementation, capability analysis, and
gap analysis in military organizations.
2.13.1 Doctrine
Doctrine is defined as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or
elements thereof guide their actions in support o f national objectives. It is authoritative
but requires judgm ent in application” (DoD, 2010, p. 78). National objectives are
declared through the National Military Strategy Directive; therefore, the NMSD is a
dominant factor and more influential than the doctrine. As a result, even though the
doctrine might play a role in downsizing decisions, the National Military Strategy
Directive is considered more influential.
2.13.2 Organization (Structure / Hierarchy o f a Military Organization)
In military organizations, structural or hierarchical changes are common.
However, they are driven by the National Military Strategy Directive, military
expenditure, or the Chief o f General Staff decisions. One o f those three factors might be a
trigger to eliminate or to create a structural unit that could lead to personnel downsizing
or upsizing.
Peacetime positions are called peacetime establishment (PE) (Chairman O f The
JCOS Instruction, 2013). Positions during crises and war are called crisis establishment
(CE) (Chairman O f The JCOS Instruction, 2013). Therefore, military organizations may
position some o f their personnel in new PE posts rather than taking them out o f the
system.
Military organizations are non-profit governmental organizations. Their mission
is concerned with fulfilling the requirements for operational readiness and deterrence.
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They have to be ready when their nations need to be defended. In the operational
readiness system, not all units o f the armed forces are expected to be combat ready. There
might be some units working with only 5% or less o f their personnel during peacetime.
Some o f the units may not even have a handful o f personnel during peacetime. Weapon
systems are in hibernation mode in customized long-term depots. In case o f a crisis,
reserves are called for duty, and they get the remaining positions to make the unit 100%
full in positions. Weapon systems in hibernation mode are also ready to be used by
reserves where needed. All those actions are guided by the NMSD and ordered or
approved by the Chief o f General Staff. Hence, NMSD and C hief o f General Staff are
considered to be more influential factors than downsizing in the structure or hierarchy o f
a military organization that drive personnel downsizing in armed forces.
2.13.3 Personnel and Leadership Training
Each military employee has to be trained very well. For instance, in an infantry
squad, there are nine personnel and the staff sergeant is the squad leader. Each member in
the squad has to be trained very well. If one o f them is better trained, it does not
necessarily cause downsizing in the squad personnel number. In military organizations,
everyone has a certain job description for peacetime (PE - Peace Establishment) and
wartime (CE - Crises Establishment). The squad leader has to know how to use a rifle,
how to lead the squad, how to use a grenade, and so on. Military personnel are multi
tasked. The staff sergeant can also work in the office as a staff member in a NATO
headquarters. Every team member should be as well trained as possible. Military
organizations work with the philosophy implemented by General Hans Von Seeckt:
“Train better, fight best” (McLennan, 2012, p. 69).
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When a new warfare system joins the military, personnel that use the new warfare
system also need additional training. Military organizations have unique specifications
that are almost impossible to observe in civilian organizations. In a civilian organization
with better training and expert personnel, it might be possible to reduce some job
positions; however, in most military organizations, positions are created for a certain role
to conduct a mission during a crisis or war. Thus, personnel training is not considered a
key factor that drives downsizing in military organizations.
2.13.4 Material - Modernization, New W arfare Systems, and IT
Modernization and technological innovations such as new warfare systems could
play a role in personnel downsizing decisions, but this research posits that military
expenditure is a more influential factor. Modernization efforts are reflected on military
expenditure. Procurement (16.2% o f military budget), research, development, testing, and
evaluation (11.1% o f military budget) phases, which help to create modernized armed
forces, are included in the United States DoD FY2012 military expenditure (DoD,
2013c). Also, modernization o f the industry has been known to influence downsizing
decisions (DeWitt, 1998). In addition, in military organizations, buying new warfare
systems for the purpose o f modernization due to technological improvements might also
drive personnel downsizing. For example, classic artillery guns required two times more
personnel than the modem self-propelled artillery guns. The M l 15, 8 in (203 mm) towed
howitzer needs a 14-person crew to operate, while the modem Turkish T-l 55 Firtina
(155-mm self-propelled howitzer) needs only five crew members to operate with better
precision, a longer range, and a faster firing speed than the previous model (Global
Security, 2014a; Military Today, 2014). If armed forces decide to use the modem Firtina
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howitzer instead o f the towed howitzer, they would need to downsize nine personnel per
gun. Therefore, buying new warfare systems can affect personnel downsizing. However,
military expenditure is more influential because it is not possible for a military
organization to be modernized without expending enough money for new and
technologically improved warfare systems.
Information technologies (IT) used in military organizations are continually
improving (Catanio & Catanio, 2010). Military organizations are allocating their
resources to buy new hardware and software. In addition, they are training their personnel
to meet the requirements o f the new information technology (Catanio & Catanio, 2010).
Developments in IT might help improve effectiveness by supporting task completion
with fewer personnel. On the other hand, the nature o f military missions might require
additional tasks and personnel. When computers were not so heavily involved in the
military, it was hard and time-consuming to make changes in policies, procedures,
documents, and presentations. Therefore, commanders were careful not to give additional
corrective orders to the staff. As a result o f the development and heavy involvement o f IT
in the military, commanders are very comfortable repeatedly ordering their staff to
modify documents and presentations. In addition, staff officers working at HQs during
peacetime are multi-tasking, and they have a role as warriors as well. For civilians and
contractors, development in IT might be a downsizing factor, but in previous years when
military organizations were not so heavily involved in the system, there were fewer
civilians and contractors. In contrast, the development in IT caused more civilian
personnel involvement in military posts as subject matter experts. In addition, in order to
have up-to-date IT, software, and hardware, military organizations need a budget.
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Thus, since military expenditure already encompasses investments in
modernization, new warfare systems, and IT systems, those individual factors will not be
considered separately in this study.
2.13.5 Personnel (Downsize / Upsize Personnel)
In order to meet the requirements directed by NMSD, the C hief o f General Staff
uses downsizing or upsizing o f the Total Active Duty Personnel number as one o f the
tools. The purpose o f this study is to investigate the key factors that drive personnel
downsizing in military organizations. The Total Active Duty Personnel number is the
dependent variable, and it is affected by the key factors that drive personnel downsizing
in this study rather than being a factor itself.
2.13.6 Facilities (Close / Install / Enhance Facilities or Bases)
Military organizations need facilities and bases. Driven by the directives from
NMSD and the Chief o f General Staff, facilities or bases o f a military organization might
be closed or enhanced, or brand new ones might be installed. After closing facilities or
bases there might be excess personnel working in the facilities. Depending on the nation
and situation, the excess personnel might be assigned to another base or facility or remain
jobless once out o f the military organization. Base or facility closure directives come
through the National Military Strategy Directive and/or the Chief o f General Staff;
therefore, NMSD and the Chief o f General Staff are considered more influential. As a
result, facilities (Close / Install / Enhance Facilities / Bases) are not considered to be one
o f the most influential factors in this study.
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2.13.7 Imitating
Based on socio-cognitive theory, the successful downsizing o f competing
companies in a sector has been known to influence personnel downsizing in an
organization (Magan-Diaz & Cespedes-Lorente, 2012). Some organizations are imitating
the success stories o f others. If the most successful organization declared that the reason
behind their achievement was personnel downsizing by giving certain data and evidence,
then some other organizations might try to do the same thing. However, in military
organizations, every country has its own specific requirements and vulnerabilities. Even
though one country’s military organization wants to follow the strategy o f the top
military organization, which announced that its increased effectiveness was a result o f
personnel downsizing, it may decide not to perform personnel downsizing. The country
might refrain from personnel downsizing because o f guidance from the country’s
National Military Strategy Directive and the possible vulnerabilities that could come
from personnel downsizing. In addition, the Chief o f General Staff might not consider
imitating more successful examples. Therefore, imitating the success stories o f other
nations was not chosen as a factor that drives personnel downsizing in this study.
Contrary to civilian organizations, even though a military organization earned surplus
personnel during the post-modernization period, due to the nature o f the military
organizations, it does not lay-off the relatively spare personnel. Military organizations
have a structure for a possible defense action; however, they cannot fill all o f the
positions during peacetime.
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2.14

Cultural Clusters of NATO Countries
A cultural cluster is a group o f countries with similar cultural characteristics

(House, 2004; Russo, 2000). In this study, 28 NATO countries are grouped according to
their cultural clusters as displayed in Table 5. Cultural clusters’ groups are named
Cultural Cluster 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 .

Table 5. Cultural Clusters o f NATO Countries [Adapted from (Chnokar et al.,
2009)]
Cultural Clusters
1

Anglo
2

Germanic Europe

NATO Countries (28 Nations)
USA, Canada, United Kingdom (3 nations)

Germany, Netherlands (2 nations)

3
Latin Europe

Italy, Spain, Portugal, France (4 nations)

4
Eastern Europe

Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia (5 nations)

5
Middle East

Turkey (1 nation)

6

Nordic Europe

Not listed

Denmark (1 nation)
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway, Romania,
Slovak Republic (12 nations)
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The Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness (GLOBE) project
studied 62 nations worldwide (House, 2004). A later study examined 25 o f those 62
nations (Chnokar et al., 2009). The GLOBE project investigates the cultures by nine
dimensions including “power distance, performance orientation, uncertainty avoidance,
assertiveness, humane orientation, future orientation, in-group collectivism, institutional
collectivism, and gender egalitarianism” (Chnokar et al., 2009, p. 58). However, none of
the two aforementioned studies included 12 NATO nations, namely Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway,
Romania, and the Slovak Republic.
2.14.1 Modified Cultural Clusters
Further research was conducted to determine whether the aforementioned 12
nations can be associated to the existing cultural clusters as defined in prior research.
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden are considered Nordic countries
(Chhokar, Brodbeck, & House, 2013). The Nordic Council was founded by Denmark,
Sweden, Norway and Iceland in 1952 (Randburg, 2014). Therefore, Iceland and Norway
are considered members o f the Nordic Europe cluster in this study.
According to Bakacsi, Sandor, Andras, & Viktor, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Latvia,
and Slovenia are considered Central-eastern European countries (2002). Another study
found that Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, and former Yugoslavia are
considered eastern countries (Hampden-Tumer & Trompenaars, 2000). Yet another
found that Croatia and Slovenia are former Yugoslav states (Laurent, 2011). In addition,
the Romanian culture falls under the Central and Eastern Europe cultural cluster (Essays
UK, 2013c). The Slovak Republic (Slovakia) has been identified with cultural
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characteristics similar to the Czech Republic and Hungary (Essays UK, 2013a).
Therefore, Bulgaria, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Romania are grouped
under the Eastern Europe cluster in this study.
The Baltic countries are Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which have very similar
cultures (Bunkse & Tietze, 1994). Latvia is in the Eastern Europe cluster. Therefore,
Latvia and Estonia are considered a part o f the Eastern Europe cluster.
According to a cultural connection study on social media usage behaviors, the
Netherlands and Belgium are in the same cultural cluster (Kohl, 2008). Hence, Belgium
is considered a part o f the Germanic Europe cluster. Taking into account its shared
political, religious, and demographic history, as well as other similarities between
Luxemburg and in particular Belgium - such as the same language, traditions, and
economic structure - and in view o f a common set o f broad values, it can be stated that
Luxemburg belongs to the same cultural cluster as Germany, the Netherlands, and
Belgium (e-Luxembourg, 2007). Modified cultural clusters o f NATO countries are shown
in Table 6 .
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Table 6. Modified Cultural Clusters o f NATO Countries [Adapted from (Chnokar
et al., 2009)]
Cultural Clusters
1

Anglo
2

Germanic Europe
3
Latin Europe
A

5
Middle East
6

Nordic Europe

NATO Countries (28 Nations)
USA, Canada, United Kingdom (3 nations)

Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg (4 nations)

Italy, Spain, Portugal, France (4 nations)
Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech
Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovak Republic (13 nations)
Turkey (1 nation)

Denmark, Iceland, Norway (3 nations)

Italics indicate nations that were not originally part of the cultural clusters in the Globe research (House,
2004).

2.14.2 What Might Change Across Cultural Clusters?
The C hief o f General Staff, the National Military Strategy Directive, and military
expenditures are considered the most influential key factors that drive personnel
downsizing across NATO nations’ military organizations. The cultural characteristics of
a military organization might also affect the decision making process. For instance, in
one nation, a commander’s decision to downsize might be enough for his subordinates to
implement the decision, while in another nation subordinates might ask for the rationale
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behind the decision and might look for alignment to the National Military Strategy
Directive before deciding to obey orders. They might request permission to work on
risks, mitigations, and opportunities in order to prepare a comprehensive approach.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the research design and context o f the study. This research
utilizes a deductive approach through a quantitative research methodology in an effort to
investigate key factors that might predict personnel downsizing in military organizations
and whether those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The aim o f this
study was to investigate the relationships between one dependent variable and three
independent variables by using longitudinal data. The population under study is
multinational military organizations, and the research was conducted based on a sample
o f 28 NATO nations’ military organizations. Longitudinal data covering a 23-year period
(1990-2012) was collected from 28 NATO nations’ military organizations (armed
forces).
The analyses in this study were broken down into two main steps. In the first step
(overall analyses), an inspection o f the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in the
overall sample o f 28 nations was conducted. In the second step (cultural clusters
analyses) analyses to investigate whether the key factors differ across cultural clusters
were performed. Analyses were conducted to determine to what extent the independent
variables Military Expenditure, turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and modification
o f the National Military Strategy Directive related to the dependent variable, which is
Total Active Duty Personnel number. This chapter provides details o f the research design
and methodology o f the study.
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3.1

Research Design and Methodology
The purpose and goal o f this study were accomplished by applying a quantitative

research design, by collecting data that helped to investigate key factors that drive
personnel downsizing in military organizations, and by determining whether those factors
differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
3.1.1

Research Questions
The research questions that the study addresses were:

Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military
organizations o f NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
3.1.2

Hypotheses in Null Form
The hypotheses were grounded from previous studies’ findings.

Ho 1: Military Expenditure (% o f GDP-Gross Domestic Product) has no relationship with
personnel downsizing.
Ho2: Turnover in the Chief o f General Staff has no relationship with personnel

downsizing.
Ho3: Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive has no relationship with

personnel downsizing.
Ho4: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f G D P ) and personnel

downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
H 05: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing does

not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
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Ho 6 : The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel

downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
3.1.3

Hypotheses in Alternative Form

H a I : Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) has a statistically significant relationship with
downsizing.
H a2: Turnover in the Chief of General Staff has a statistically significant relationship
with downsizing.
Ha3: Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive has a statistically
significant relationship with downsizing.
H a4: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) and personnel
downsizing differs across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
H a5: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing
differs across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Ha 6 : The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel
downsizing differs across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
3.1.4

Population and Rationale
This research considers the overall multinational military organization (NATO) as

the unit o f analysis and NATO as the unit o f generalization.
Data was collected for 23 years (1990-2012) annually from all 28 NATO nations.
Each data point is a line in the data set. For each data point, there are six MS Excel data
cells as shown in Table 7. There are 23 data points per country. The total number o f data
points in this study is 644. In addition, the cultural cluster associated with the data point
was also included. There were missing data during certain periods for some o f the NATO
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nations. Missing data which can be summarized by nation and time period as follows:
Albania 1990-1991, Croatia 1990-1991, Czech Republic 1990-1992, Estonia 1990-1991,
Iceland 1990-1994, Latvia 1990-1992, Lithuania 1990-1992, Slovak Republic 19901992, and Slovenia 1990-1991 (The World Bank, 2014).

Table 7. Data Points and MS Excel Data Cells
Tenure of National Military
Total Active Military
Strategy Directive Cultural
Duty
Expenditure Chief of
Cluster
Nation Year Personnel # (% of GDP) General Staff
Maturity
Belgium 1990

110,000

2.3924

Belgium 1991

106,000

2.2895

Belgium 1992

101,000

2.2240

1 (Turnover)

1 (Modification)

2 (Second

2 (Second year in

year o f duty)

effect)

3

3

Excel
Data
Cells

2

7 cells

2

7 cells

2

7 cells
7 cells

United
2012

1,520,100

4.7454

2

1

1

7 cells

States

Total 28 nations for 23 years 28*23 = 644 data points

4508
Total
excel data
cells.

A data point related to the United States in 2012 is highlighted as a sample in the
data set. Data points in this study include Nation, Year, Total Active Duty Personnel
number, Military Expenditure (% o f GDP), turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive.
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3.2

Data Collection
A variety o f data sources were used for data triangulation. Data related to the

Total Active Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) was mainly
collected from the Word Bank and S1PR1 (SIPRI, 2013, 2014; The World Bank, 2014).
Data related to the Chief o f General Staff was collected from NATO’s official site and
the NATO nations’ armed forces official webpages. Data related to the National Military
Strategy Directive (NMSD) was collected from the National Liaison Representatives
(NLRs) o f 28 NATO nations working collaboratively with Headquarters Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation (HQ SACT), N ATO’s official site, and the NATO nations’
armed forces official webpages. Data related to NATO nations’ cultural clusters was
mainly collected from the NATO nations’ official webpages and the GLOBE study
(Chnokar et al., 2009; House, 2004). The lists o f the data sources are detailed in the
appendix.
3.3

Statistical Tool
The Stata 13.1 (Serial number: 301309290450) statistical tool was used in this

research. Stata offers great possibilities for programming, and it makes it possible to
perform time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analyses. Stata also makes it
possible to use the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) technique
for this research.
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3.4

Data Analysis Technique

3.4.1

Time Series Cross-Sectional Analysis Technique
This method has been previously suggested as appropriate for longitudinal

research designs that involve repeated measures taken on the same subject overtime at
regular intervals (Salkind, 2010).
This study used time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analysis, which
provides mathematically rigorous theory and techniques. This study uses multivariate
time series analysis that accounts for a dependent variable (Yt0 and its lagged values (Y(t.
Di) as well as several independent (Xtj) variables and their lagged values. The research
data was in a linear time series model for all the dependent and independent variables for
the period o f 1990-2012. It describes the relationship between dependent variable and
independent variables with lagged values. Time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data
is typically characterized by time series data collected at the same time or during the
same time period for all the dependent and independent variables (Holtz-Eakin, Newey,
& Rosen, 1988).
The time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analyses presented the
challenge o f analyzing data from different time periods. As shown in Figure 9, there was
an incomplete data set, including all the indicators over the entire period (Cuevas &
Quilis, 2012). Hence, analyzing that kind o f data required advanced statistical methods.
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Indicators

> T m e senes
Longitodnal pand

Observed
Non observed

Figure 9. Time Series Cross-Sectional Dynamic Panel Data Design

In Figure 9, indicators from 28 NATO nations contain different sections that
embody cross-sectional data. Each nation can be considered a different panel, and
collectively the data set can be considered panel data. Since data was collected over 23
years for each country, it constitutes time series dynamic data. The combination o f the
aforementioned data types created the time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data for
this study.
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3.4.2

Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments Model and Rationale
In search o f a model to analyze time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data,

different possible statistical models were investigated, and trial runs were performed with
sample data. As Pollock (2006) states, “Regression analysis produces a statistic, the
regression coefficient, that estimates the effect o f an independent variable on a dependent
variable” (p. 137). The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) model
is a regression model used to analyze the causal relationship between dependent and
independent variables that conform with time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data.
This statistical method can model both unit heterogeneity (between-subject) and time
heterogeneity (within-subject) (Alvarez & Arellano, 1998). The Arellano-Bond GMM
model suggests using a lag o f two or more periods as instruments o f estimation in order
to gain efficiency (Arellano, 2003; Bilgicer, Jedidi, Lehmann, & Neslin, 2014). The
Arellano-Bond GMM model assumes that there is no serial correlation in the
idiosyncratic errors but that they are dependent over time periods (Arellano & Bond,
1991).
One o f the advantages o f using Arellano-Bond GMM in the time series crosssectional dynamic panel data was that the model increased the degrees o f freedom due to
the higher amount o f individual observations. Another advantage was that the model
reduced collinearity among explanatory variables, which provided a better estimation
precision. Another advantage o f the model was the enhancement o f estimator precision
by eliminating time-variant individual covariates. Yet another advantage was that due to
the model characteristics, it was possible to investigate heterogeneity by gathering
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information about previous time periods (Ejzykowicz, 2013; Hsiao, 2003; Wooldridge,
2 0 1 0 ).

A type o f regression analysis is used to create “a mathematical model that
adequately described Y as a function o f the X 's, or that predicted Y from the X 's” (Porta,
2008, p. 53). Correlation and regression analysis are related in the sense that both deal
with relationships among variables (Porta, 2008). The purpose o f this study was to
investigate the relationship between personnel downsizing ( Y ) and Military Expenditure
(X|), turnover in Chief o f General Staff (X 2 ), and modification o f the National Military
Strategy Directive ( X 3). As a result, the study was particularly suited for the use o f a
multi regression. The initial model was formulated as:
Y =f (X,, X 2, Xj).
This study assessed independence by firstly testing the null hypothesis (H o : p =
0

) by subtracting the fitted values from the actual values using a regression analysis, and

secondly by calculating the values o f the autocorrelations among the data points (each
line point on a data set). The time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analysis
formula was applied to the data set using the following equation:
“Yu ~ Xu + pi + 8 j + e,

Y(t.,n = X (l.,}l + (p, + e i -

P i -

Bi) +

” (Drukker, 2008, p. 3).

In this equation, (p) and (0) are unknown parameters, (i) is the number o f
independent variables and the equation number in ( t ) year; ( Y tj) is the value o f personnel
downsizing (dependent variable), (Xti) is Military Expenditure, (Xa) is turnover in the
Chief o f General Staff, (Xt3 ) is modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive,
(e,) is the error term (noise), Y (t-i >i, X(t-i)i and e(t-i),are the values o f ( Y ), (X) and (e), in
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the previous year (t-1). In this case, Y(t.|)„ X(,_i>j and e(t.i)j are called lagged values o f (Y),
(X) and (e).
To continue the calculations, the A (Delta) (slope) value was needed. The change
in data was calculated by using the formula A j = [(X tj) - ( X (t.|)j)] / ( X (t-i),)- In the formula,
A stands for slope o f the calculation, ( X tj) stands for value o f current year, ( X (t. i )l) stands
for value o f the previous year (lagged value). The slope value may be either positive or
negative, where a positive value means there is an incline and a negative value means
there is a decline between current and previous values.
(p) and (9) are unknown parameters that symbolize any unknown correlation, that
can’t be measured and/or observed. After running the equation by using first lagged
values o f the dependent variable, in (t- 1 ) year:
Y(i-1)i =

+ (p, + 8 , - pi - 6 i) + e n.i),

the unknown parameters (p<; 9 j) are gone.
Y(t-l)i = X (t-l)i + e(t-l)i
There is still noise (the error term) in the equation. With the assumption that “the
difference o f the second lag o f a dependent variable is strictly exogenous [Strict
exogeneity requires that (e,*) be unrelated to dependent variable for ( t ) > (t-i)]” (Drukker,
2908, p. 7) a second value is calculated: “GMM uses lags as instruments to give unbiased
and consistent estimates o f the coefficients. The first lag equation removes fixed
household effects and creates variables as instruments to create moments for estimation”
(Bilgicer et al., 2014, p. 6 ). After calculating the second lag values, the error term (ej) is
gone.
AiYi = AXi + (eti - e(t-1)i)
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This practice removes unobserved entities as well as bias estimates (Arellano & Bond,
1991). This model uses lags o f exogenous variables at (t-2) time. GMM estimation
enhances efficiency by applying deeper lagged values (two or more) to use them as
instruments (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In order to get unbiased and consistent estimates
the resulting equation shouldn’t have second or higher order autocorrelation (Bilgicer et
al„ 2014).
Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests were performed during the analyses.
The presence o f heteroskedasticity and lack o f autocorrelation yields enhanced estimates
in GMM models(Greene, 2003). Arellano-Bond GMM controls the dependent variable’s
previous values for the previous years (Arellano & Bond, 1991). When an analysis with
three lags is performed to assess the dependent variable’s value in (t) time, the GMM
model can control values in (t-3, t-2, t-1) time. This is a very important estimation
method used to assess the correlation between the Total Active Duty Personnel number
(Y) and Military Expenditure (X |), turnover in the Chief o f General Staff (X 2 ), and the
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive (X 3 ). This is because an
ascending or descending change in Military Expenditure, a turnover in C hief o f General
Staff, or a modification in the National Military Strategy Directive in (t-3) time might
drive an ascending or descending change in the Total Active Duty Personnel number in
(t-3, t-2, t-1, t, t+1) time and so on (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Analyses were conducted by using the Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM)
estimator o f the Arellano-Bond time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data model
(Arellano, 2003). During the analysis phase, the model was tested for being strictly
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exogenous; this determined whether the data used in this study meets the requirements o f
the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments model (Drukker, 2008).
3.4.3

Variables, Indicators and Metrics
There are one dependent and three independent variables in this study. The Total

Active Duty Personnel number was considered the dependent variable. Military
Expenditure, the Chief o f General Staff, and the National Military Strategy Directive
were considered independent variables. Year and Nation were considered dummy
variables. Cultural Clusters was considered a categorical variable.
3.4.3.1

Dependent Variable, Indicator and Metric
Total Active Duty Personnel: The Total Active Duty Personnel number was

considered the dependent variable. Any reduction in Total Active Duty Personnel
quantity was considered an indicator o f personnel downsizing, whereas an increase was
considered upsizing. Total Active Duty Personnel is to show numbers as they were for
each NATO nations’ armed forces (e.g. 1,520.100).
3.4.3.2

Independent Variables, Indicators and Metrics
Military Expenditure (% o f GDP): This variable represents the annual military

expenditure o f a NATO nation as the percentage o f its GDP (Gross Domestic Product). In
the data set, military expenditure is to show 14 decimal places (e.g.
1.56352950795231%).
Chief o f General Staff: This variable represents the number o f years the Chief o f
General Staff o f a NATO nation was on duty. In other words, it is tenure o f the Chief o f
General Staff. The first year o f tenure was coded as ‘ 1’, the second year was coded as ‘2 ’,
and the third year was coded as ‘3’ and so on (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ).
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National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD): This variable represents the
number o f years the National Military Strategy Directive o f a NATO nation was in effect.
In other words, it is NMSD maturity. The first year o f NMSD maturity was coded as *1’;
the second year was coded as ‘2’ and so on (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).
3.4.3.3

Dummy Variables, Indicators and Metrics:
Year: The years from 1990 through 2012 were considered. Years were coded by

their number.
Nation: 28 NATO nations were considered. Nations were coded by their name.
3.4.3.4

Categorical Variable, Indicator and Metric:
Cultural Clusters: Cultural clusters were considered a categorical variable. The

groups o f Cultural Clusters were coded as group ‘ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 ’ as shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. Cultural Clusters o f NATO Countries by Group Codes [Adapted from
(Chnokar et al., 2009)]
Group Codes

NATO Countries (28 Nations)

1

Anglo (USA, Canada, United Kingdom)

2

Germanic Europe (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg)

3

Latin Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, France)

4

Eastern Europe (Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech
Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovak Republic)

5

Middle East (Turkey)

6

Nordic Europe (Denmark, Iceland, Norway)

3.5

Measurement
The data set was created in accordance with the Stata tool requirements. The

Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) model in robust type was
performed in the Stata by importing data from the data set. The relationship between
Total Active Duty Personnel and Military Expenditure (% o f GDP), tenure o f the Chief
o f General Staff and the National Military Strategy Directive maturity was tested in
accordance with the hypotheses.
If the slope value o f the change in Total Active Duty Personnel number is
negative, there is personnel downsizing; if the change is positive, it is considered
upsizing. When there is active military personnel downsizing and the slope o f Military
Expenditure is negative, it means there is a positive correlation between them. When
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more personnel downsizing occurs as tenure o f the Chief o f General Staff increases, it
means there is a positive correlation between them. When military personnel downsizing
increases as NMSD maturity does, it means there is a positive correlation between them.
In the overall analyses (Step 1 analyses), data derived from 28 NATO nations was
used for calculations. When the results were statistically significant, it indicated that the
related independent variable is a key factor that drives personnel downsizing in military
organizations.
3.5.1

Measurement for the Cultural Clusters Analyses
In the Cultural Clusters analyses (Step 2 analyses), the same analyses were

conducted within each o f the Cultural Clusters. Each cluster’s results were compared to
the output o f the overall analyses (Step 1 analyses), and the difference was investigated to
determine whether related key factors differed across Cultural Clusters. Operational
Definitions, Indicators, and Metrics are synthesized in Table 9.

Table 9. Variables, Operational Definitions, Indicators and Metrics

V ariable

O p e ratio n al Definition

In d ic a to r

M etric

D ependent

Total Active Duty Personnel is the total number of Any am ount o f reduction in

v ariable: Total

armed forces personnel o f each NATO nation that

Total Active Duty Personnel Military Personnel were calculated in the

Active Duty

has “full-time occupation as part o f a military

quantity was considered an

model. Total Active Duty Personnel number

Personnel

organization, including paramilitary forces if the

indicator o f personnel

is to show numbers as it was for each NATO

training, organization, equipment, and control

downsizing.

nations’ armed forces (e.g. 1,520,100).

Two lagged values o f M ilitary Expenditure

Three lagged values o f Total Active Duty

suggest they may be used to support or replace
regular military forces” (The World Bank, 2014, p.
1).
In d ep en d en t

“Military Expenditure is all costs incurred as a

This variable represents the

V ariable:

result o f current military activities o f a NATO

annual M ilitary Expenditure were calculated in the model. Military

Military

nation” (SIPRI, 2014). M ilitary Expenditure is the

o f a N A TO nation as the

Expenditure was to show 14 decimal places

Expenditure (% o f percentage o f GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of

percentage o f its GDP (Gross (e.g. 1.56352950795231%).

GDP)

each NATO nation.

Domestic Product).

In d ep en d en t

The C hief o f General S taff is the person in

This variable represents the

V ariable: C hief

command / lead o f all the forces in a NATO

number o f years the C hief o f Staff were calculated in the model. The first

o f General Staff

nation’s military organization (DoD, 2010).

General Staff o f a NATO

Two lagged values o f the C hief o f General

year o f tenure was coded as ‘ 1’, the second

nation was on duty. In other year was coded as ‘2’, the third year was
words, it is tenure o f the
C hief o f General Staff.

coded as ‘3 ’ and so on. (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).

Table 9. Continued

In d ep en d en t

The National Military Strategy Directive is an official

Modification o f NM SD

Two lagged values o f NM SD were

V ariable: National

paper for distributing and applying military power to

stands for the year when a

calculated in the model. The first

Military Strategy

attain national security and defense strategy objectives

newer version o f NM SD is

year o f N M SD maturity was coded

Directive (NMSD)

(DoD, 2010). NMSD is published periodically.

published. In other words, it

as ‘ 1 the second year was coded

Publication periods across NATO countries differ from

is NM SD maturity.

as ‘2' and so on. (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6).

nation to nation (e.g. annually, bi-annually).
Data was calculated by

Cultural Clusters o f NA TO nations

C ateg o rical

Cultural cluster is a group o f countries with similar

V ariab le: Cultural

cultural characteristics (House, 2004; Russo, 2000). In this Cultural Clusters.

were grouped by numbers from ‘ 1’

Clusters

study, 28 NATO countries are grouped according to their

through ‘6 ’.

cultural clusters.
D um m y V ariable:

Year was considered dummy variable.

Year
D um m y V ariable:
Nation

The years from 1990 through Years were coded by their number.
2012 were considered.

Nation was considered dummy variable.

28 NATO nations were

Nations were coded by their name.

considered.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSES AND FINDINGS

The purpose o f this quantitative study was to investigate key factors that drive
personnel downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations and whether or not
those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. This chapter provides details
o f the analyses and findings of the study. The questions for this descriptive research are
stated below:
Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military
organizations o f NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
In order to find the answers to these research questions, analyses were conducted
in two main steps. For the first step (Step 1: overall analyses), an inspection o f the key
factors that drive personnel downsizing in these NATO nations’ military organizations
was analyzed. For the second step (Step 2: cultural clusters analyses), whether or not the
key factors differ across cultural clusters was analyzed.
4.1

Hypotheses in Null Form
The null hypotheses are stated below:

H oi: Military Expenditure (% o f GDP-Gross Domestic Product) has no relationship with
personnel downsizing.
Ho2: Turnover in the Chief o f General Staff has no relationship with personnel

downsizing.
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Ho3: Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive has no relationship with

personnel downsizing.
H0 4: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) and personnel
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Ho5: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing does

not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
H 0 6 : The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses by determining to what extent the
independent variables Military Expenditure, turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive related to the dependent variable,
the Total Active Duty Personnel number.
4.2

Data Description
The unit o f analyses was nations’ military organizations. Data was collected for

23 years (1990-2012) annually, with the size o f the panels [N= 28 (28 NATO nations)
and T= 23 (23 years)]. Each data point (each line in the data set) in this study represented
Nation, Year, Total Active Duty Personnel number, Military Expenditure (% o f GDP),
turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and modification o f the National Military Strategy
Directive. Except for grouping and converging some data points under Cultural Clusters
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 , the same data set was used in the Cultural Cluster analyses.
If this study was strongly balanced, it could have a total o f 2576 observations;
however, due to a lack o f data, the number o f total observations was 2423 (only 153
missing, 5.94%). The number o f observations for Year was 644 (28 nations * 23 years),
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for the Total Active Duty Personnel number it was 621, for Military Expenditure (% o f
GDP) it was 608, for turnover in the C hief o f General Staff it was 622, and for
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive it was 572. The reasons behind
the missing data were that some NATO nations gained independence after 1990, so there
were no established armed forces or no recorded data for some nations for a certain
period o f time. Some o f the missing data by nation and time period were as follows:
Albania 1990-1991, Croatia 1990-1991, Czech Republic 1990-1992, Estonia 1990-1991,
Iceland 1990-1994, Latvia 1990-1992, Lithuania 1990-1992, Slovak Republic 19901992, and Slovenia 1990-1991 (The World Bank, 2014). Iceland had no records o f Active
Duty Personnel until 1995, and there was no recorded military expenditure until 2009.
Luxemburg had no records for the national military strategy directive until 2000. The
data collected from 28 NATO nations for 23 years is represented by the graphs in Figures
10-13.
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Figure 11. Military Expenditures (% o f GDP) by Nation
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Figure 13. National Military Strategy Directive Maturity by Nation

The tenure o f the Chief o f General Staff changes from nation to nation. In order to
visualize the overall distribution, a histogram for the 28 NATO nations is displayed in
Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Tenure of Chief o f General Staff Comprehensive Histogram

The National Military Strategy Directive maturity also changes from nation to
nation. The comprehensive histogram for the 28 NATO nations is displayed in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. National Military Strategy Directive Maturity Comprehensive Histogram
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The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) estimation
(multivariate regression) model was used to analyze the time series cross-sectional
dynamic panel data in this study (Alvarez & Arellano, 1998). Variables and their defined
labels in Stata are stated in Table 10. The data set was unbalanced since there were
missing data for some NATO nations.

Table 10. Variables and Their Stata Labels
Type

Variable Name

Stata Labels

Dependent

Total Active Duty Personnel

Totaladp

Independent

Military Expenditure (% o f GDP)

Mi lex

Independent

Chief o f General Staff

Chiefogs

Independent

National Military Strategy Directive

Nmsd

Categorical

Cultural Clusters

CulturalCls

Dummy

Year

Year

Dummy

Nation

Nation

The data set was created by using MS Excel and imported into Stata by coding. A
sample o f the data set used in the analyses is shown in Table 11.
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Table 11. A Sample from Data Set
chiefogs

5.88830083200000000

2

4

1

4

4.64945888260734000

1

4

65000

3.19929790315127000

2

4

2010

1569417

4.84264948610899000

4

3

1

2011

1520100

4.74543235076344000

1

1

1

2012

1492200

4.21542916415301000

2

2

1

Year

totaladp

Albania

1990

Albania

1991

Albania

1992

65000

Albania

1993

nmsd

CulturalCIs

milex

Nation

United
States

United
States

United
States

4.2.1

Pre-estimation Diagnostic Tests
In order to ensure that the data set fits with the requirements o f the Arellano-Bond

GMM model, several pre-estimation diagnostic tests were performed before the analyses.
Firstly, a random/fixed effect test was performed. Secondly, the Arellano-Bond for zero
autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors test was performed to check for
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overidentification that helped to clarify whether variables were correlated with residuals
or not and to test for the presence o f exogeneity (Roodman, 2009). Thirdly, the White
heteroskedasticity test was performed to ensure that error terms did not exhibit constant
variance (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
4.2.1.1

Random Effect / Fixed Effect Test
In order to determine if the data set has Random Effect or Fixed Effect, the

Random Effect (RE) / Fixed Effect (FE) estimation test was performed. The Random
Effect estimation assumes that “the variation across entities is random and uncorrelated
with the predictor or independent variables” (Torres-Reyna, 2007, p. 25). On the other
hand, in the Fixed Effect model “each entity is different therefore the entity’s error term
and the constant (which captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with
the others” (Torres-Reyna, 2007, p. 9). The Random / Fixed Effect Test Results are
shown in Table 12.

Table 12. Random / Fixed Effect Test Results
Coefficients
sqrt(diag(V b-V B))
(b)
(B)
(b-B)
fixed
random
Difference
S.E.
266.1941
milex
38457.03
39392.87
-935.8378
chiefogs
-287.6966
-292.6547
4.958102
25.39243
35.44969
nmsd
1931.627
1958.296
-26.6688
chi2(3) = (b-B)'[( V_b-V_B)A( - 1)](b-B) = 12.38
Prob>chi2 = 0.0062
Note, b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic.
Significant at Prob < 0.05 level.
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The null hypothesis for the test defines the Random Effect as consistent (TorresReyna, 2007). In Table 12, (Prob > chi2 = 0.0062) means that there was enough evidence
to reject the null hypothesis suggesting that the model is appropriate for the Fixed Effect
estimation.
4.2.1.2

Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test
The Arellano-Bond GMM requires exogeneity, which means unobserved

instruments should not be correlated with other covariates in the data set (Drukker, 2008).
The Arellano-Bond GMM model assumes that there is no serial correlation in the
idiosyncratic errors but does not assume independence over time periods (Arellano &
Bond, 1991). Table 13 displays the Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test results.

Table 13. Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order
z
Prob > z
1
-2.0733
0.0381
2
.07433
0.9407
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation
Significant at p < 0.05 level.

In Table 13, it was expected that the first differences in the first row usually reject
the null hypothesis (Ho = there is no autocorrelation), since the differences include the
errors (Wooldridge, 2010). The second row was more important since it was designed to
detect autocorrelation in lagged values. In the second row, the (Prob > z 0.9407) supports
Ho - no autocorrelation with a value above the significance level o f (Prob < 0.05)

(Torres-Reyna, 2007). The test showed that Hq cannot be rejected (z = 0.07433).
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Therefore, the data set used in this study had no autocorrelation, and it was strictly
exogenous. The data set met the requirements o f the Arellano-Bond GMM model.
4.2.1.3 White Heteroskedasticity Test
The White Test has a null hypothesis, which states that the variance is constant
and there is homoskedasticity (Chen, 2003; Greene, 2003). The White Heteroskedasticity
Test results are shown in Table 14.

Table 14. White Heteroskedasticity Test Results
_______________________________ White's general test statistic______________________________
Number o f obs = 553
F( 3, 549)
= 10.78
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared
= 0.3286
_________________________________________________ Root MSE
= 2.8e+05_____________
Robust
totaladp
Coef.
Std. Err.________t_________ P>|t|_________[95% Conf. Interval]
milex
200438.8
37338.93
5.37
0.000
127094.1
273783.4
chiefogs
978.1836
6826.96
0.14
0.886
-12431.98
14388.34
nmsd
9907.811
4732.28
2.09
0.037________ 612.2197
19203.4
____________ White's general test statistic : 315.5751 Chi-sq( 9) p-value = 1.3e-62___________
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.________________________________________________________

With respect to heteroskedasticity, the p-value (Prob > F = 0.0001) indicates that
Ho was rejected. The White Heteroskedasticity Test results showed strong evidence that
the data was heteroskedastic.
4.3

Step 1: Overall Analyses
The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) one-step difference

method with robust standard errors was performed in order to test the hypotheses in two

steps: Step 1: Overall Analyses and Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses. Stata 'xtabond'
estimation was used during the analyses (StataCorp, 2013).
4.3.1

Step 1 Analyses
In Step 1, the data derived from 28 NATO nations was used to analyze the

relationship between the Total Active Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure
(% o f GDP), turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and modification o f the National
Military Strategy Directive. The first three hypotheses out o f the six were tested in this
step. The results for Step 1 are displayed in Table 15.
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Table 15. Results of Step 1: Overall Analyses
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Number o f obs

Group variable : nation_n
Time variable : Year

458

Number o f groups
Obs per group: min
avg

Number o f instruments = 256
One-step results

max
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n)

28
1
16.35714
19
=

Wald chi2 (27)

6169.16

Prob > chi2

0.0000

Robust Std.
totaladp

Err.

z

P>W

.0642885
.0412745
.037129

8.64

0.000
0.118
0.572

.4295184

.6815249

-.0163883
-.0517787

.0937642

1.61
0.71

-6967.631

4258.892

-1.64

0.108
0.479
0.102

-3015.172
-6516.682
-15314.91

30315.14

3686.282

8502.788
5205.689

-378.5935
900.1036

-0.44
1.11
-2.07

0.660
0.268
0.039

-2067.788

1310.602

-2306.316

861.85
811.9682
1115.754

-691.3248
-4493.154

2491.532
-119.4789

1843.424

484.3892

3.81

0.000

672.3626
783.8299
8628.54

-0.93
2.14
0.46

0.354
0.032
0.647

894.0383
-1940.619

2792.809

-622.8125
1679.392
3946.233

Coef.

totaladp
LI.

.5555217

L2.

.0645083

L3.
milex
--.

.0209928

LI.
L2.
chiefogs
--.
LI.
L2.
nmsd
—.
LI.
L2.
_IYear_1993

13649.99

1.56
0.57

[95% Conf. Interval]

143.1135
-12965.39

.1454048

13889.25
1379.644

694.9941
3215.67
20857.86

Instruments for differenced equation
GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

The interpretation o f the results is detailed in Table 16. In the table, Only the
Chief o f General Staff (chiefogs) lines were interpreted; the other lines (milex, nmsd)
were likewise interpreted but not displayed in Table 16. The Total Active Duty Personnel
number (totaladp) was calculated with three lagged values. LI displays the first lagged
values, L2 the second, and L3 the third in totaladp lines. Year as a dummy variable
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displays totaladp values, and since it was calculated in three-lagged order, the results
begin with 1993 where 1990 was the first year o f the observations.
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Table 16. Interpretation of the Step 1: Overall Results
Expression

In terp retatio n

Number o f obs = 458

Total number o f data cell used was 458.

Number o f groups -

Total number o f groups used was 28 NATO nations.

28
Wald chi2 (2 7) =

The probability o f results by chance was extremely unlikely.

6169.16
Prob > chi2 =
0.0000

The probability o f results by chance, in statistical term 0.0000 is assumed
as 0.0001.

Degrees o f freedom
= W aldchi2 (27) =

There are 27 pieces o f independent information.

27
Chiefogs L2.Coef =
(-2306.316)
Chiefogs L2. Robust
Std. Err. = 1115.754

One unit change in C hief o f General Staff drives personnel downsizing
o f 2306 military personnel for the second lagged calculations.
The robust standard error for the second lagged calculations was
1115.754.
z-values test the hypothesis that each coefficient was different from zero.

Chiefogs L2.z = -

To reject this, the absolute z-value has to be higher than 1.96 (for a 95%

2.07
confidence). The z-value for second lagged calculations was (-2.07).
The relationship between the Total Active Duty Personnel number and
Chiefogs L2. P> \z\ =
0.039

C hief o f General Staff was significant with a value o f 0.039 for the
second lagged calculations, where (p < 0.05) rejects the H0. (H0 = There
is no significant relationship).

Chiefogs L2. [95%
Conf. Interval] =

95% Confidence Interval was the range o f values with 95% certainty that
contain the population mean. The range for C hief o f General Staff second

[-4 493.154/
-119.4789]

lagged calculations was between [-449393.154 and -119.4789],
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4.3.2

Step 1: Overall Hypotheses Test
In order to test the hypothesized relationships between the Total Active Duty

Personnel number and Military Expenditure, the turnover in the C hief o f General Staff,
and modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive, the Arellano-Bond
Generalized One Step-Difference Method o f Moments technique with robust standard
errors was performed by using three lagged values (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Table 17
displays the details from Step 1: Overall hypotheses test results.
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Table 17. Step 1: List of Hypotheses and Summary of Findings
Hypothesis in
HA#

Alternative Form

Summary of
Coefficient Value

Findings
(p = 0.102)

(-6967.631)
Military Expenditure (% o f GDP-

Not significant
One percent change in Military

H aI

Gross Domestic Product) has a

with a negative
Expenditure (% o f GDP) drives

statistically significant relationship

value
personnel downsizing o f 6967

with personnel downsizing.
military personnel.
Not Supported
(p = 0.039)
(-2306.316)
Significant

Turnover in C hief o f General Staff
A one-year o f additional tenure of
_

HA2

with a negative

has a statistically significant
C hief o f General Staff drives
relationship with personnel

value
personnel downsizing o f 2306

downsizing.
military personnel.
Supported

Ha3

(1679.392)

(p = 0.032)

Modification o f the National

A one-year o f additional maturity

Significant

Military Strategy Directive has a

in the National Military Strategy

with a positive

statistically significant relationship

Directive drives personnel

value

with personnel downsizing.

upsizing o f 1679 military
personnel.

Supported

Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive and change in Military
Expenditure was not found to relate significantly to the Total Active Duty Personnel
number in the overall analysis o f 28 NATO nations from 1990 through 2012. Turnover in
the Chief o f General Staff and modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive
were found to be significant at the 0.05 level. A one-year o f additional tenure o f the Chief
of General Staff drives 2306 active duty personnel downsizing on average, and one year
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o f additional maturity in the National Military Strategy Directive drives personnel
upsizing o f 1679 military personnel on average. In light o f these findings, Ho was not
supported at a 95% level o f confidence; there was enough evidence to conclude that
turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was significant with a negative value, and
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive was significant with a positive
value related to the Total Active Duty Personnel number.
4.3,3

Post-Hoc Tests

4.3.3.1

Interaction Between Independent Variables Tests
Acock (2010) states, “Multicollinearity happens when a combination o f variables

makes one or more o f the variables largely or completely redundant” (p. 262).
Multicollinearity occurs when there is a high level o f correlation between an independent
variable and another independent variable or a set o f independent variables (Wooldridge,
2010). The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to assess whether multicollinearity is a
problem or not for independent variables and, if so, to what extent. VIF is equal to 1/(1R2) (Acock, 2010). The results for the interaction test appear in Table 18.

Table 18. The Results of the VIF Test
Variable
milex
nmsd
chiefogs
Mean VIF

VIF
1.05
1.03
1.02
1.03

1/VIF
0.953296
0.973278
0.979021
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If VIF is more than 10 for any variable, there is a multicollinearity problem
(Acock, 2010). The mean VIF value for independent variables was 1.03, which is less
than 10, so there was no implicitly high correlation between an independent variable and
another independent variable or a set o f independent variables. The VIF test results
displayed no indication o f multicollinearity problems. There was enough evidence to
conclude that there was no interaction between one independent variable and another
independent variable or a set o f independent variables.
4.3.3.2

Pesaran’s and Frees’ Cross-Sectional Independence Test
In order to test cross-sectional independence (to determine if the residuals are

correlated across nations), Pesaran’s and Frees’ cross-sectional independence tests were
performed (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). The Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test,
also called contemporaneous correlation, investigates the presence o f a correlation
between the residuals and different entities that can yield biased results (Torres-Reyna,
2007). The data set hosts for (N=28) NATO nations and (T= 23) years. The null
hypothesis (Ho) is that residuals are not correlated (Ho = cross-sectional independence)
for (N—* oo) and T is sufficiently large (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). In order to
implement the Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test, adequate number o f crosssectional units with common points in time is needed (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006).. The
test results are displayed in Table 19.

89
Table 19. Cross Sectional Independence Test Results
_________ Pesaran's Test of Cross Sectional Independence_________
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence = 15.573, Pr = 0.0000
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements = 0.420
Frees' Test o f Cross Sectional Independence________________________
Frees' test o f cross sectional independence =
1.544
Critical values from Frees' Q distribution
alpha = 0.10
0.5822
alpha = 0.05
0.8391
____________________alpha = 0.01___________________1.4211_____________________________
Note. Pesaran's Test H0 = cross-sectional independence
Frees' test a value: Significant at a < 0.05 level.____________________________________________

The Pesaran’s test strongly rejected the null hypothesis (Ho = cross-sectional
independence) with the results o f (Pr = 0.0001) and an average absolute correlation value
o f 0.420. Results showed enough evidence to assess that there was cross-sectional
dependence. Therefore, there were enough common units to implement analyses. Frees’
test also rejects (for a = 0.05 : 0.8391) the null hypothesis. However, “for small values o f
(T - 23) the normal approximation to the Q distribution is poor” (De Hoyos & Sarafidis,
2006, p. 7). On the other hand, for T as large as 30, the approximation does well. There
was enough evidence to suggest that the model had enough cross-sectional units with
common points in time to be able to implement the analyses (De Hoyos & Sarafidis,
2006). The Pesaran’s test strongly rejected the null hypothesis (Ho = cross-sectional
independence) and “rejecting the null hypothesis in all subsets would serve as an
indication that there is cross-sectional dependence in the disturbances that needs to be
taken into account” (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006, p. 490). In conclusion, there is crosssectional dependence in data and the size o f the panels (N = 28 and T = 23) demonstrate
that cross-sectional dependence is not a problem in the study.
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4.3.3.3

R-Squared Test
In this study, the time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data was used. R-

squared (R2) is the coefficient o f determination and shows how much o f the variance of
the dependent variable is explained by the correlation o f independent variables. It is
between [0 and 1]; the larger the number means the correlation is stronger (Pollock,
2006). Table 20 shows the results for R2.

Table 20. Results o f R 2 Test
Fixed-effects (w ithin) OLS regression
Fixed-effects (within) regression
Number o f obs
=
553
Group variable: nation n
Number o f groups =
28
4
R-sq: within
Obs per group: min =
= 0.1513
avg
19.8
Between = 0.4225
max
23
overall
= 0.3285
F(3,522)
31.02
corr(u i, Xb) = 0.4989
Prob > F
= 0.0000
Robust Std.
Std. Err.
total adp
Coef.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
milex
4004.509
9.60
38457.03
0.000
[30590.1 46323.96]
1723.159
-0.17
chiefogs
-287.6966
0.867
[-3672.876 3097.483]
1931.627
1.44
nmsd
1338.45
0.150
[-697.7834 4561.038]
11.29
cons
124301.6
11011.01
0.000
[102670.3 145932.91
sigmau
305331.16
sigmae
55490.782
rho
.96802675
(fraction o f variance due to u i)
F test that all u i=0:
F(27, 522) = 498.34
Prob > F = 0.0000

The overall R-sq (R2) value is 0.3285 meaning approximately 33% o f variation in the
Total Active Duty Personnel number was explained by Military Expenditure, turnover in
the Chief o f General Staff, and modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive.
The remaining 67% is unexplained by the independent variables. The errors are
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correlated with the independent variables with a value o f corr ( u i , Xb) = 0.4989. The
Chief o f General Staff (p = 0.867) and the National Military Strategy Directive (p =
0.150) have significant influence on the Total Active Duty Personnel number. “Sigma u
is the standard deviation o f residuals within groups ui:sigma_e is the standard deviation
o f residuals (overall error term) e,'' (Torres-Reyna, 2007, p. 19). In this study, sigma u
value was 305331.16 and sigma e value was 55490.782. A fraction o f the variance due to
u i (rho / Pearson's Correlation Coefficient) is also known as the interclass correlation
(Torres-Reyna, 2007). In this study, the rho value is 0.97, which means that 97% o f the
variance is due to differences across the panels. However, “ In the presence of
heteroskedasticity, the R-squared from an OLS (fixed effect) regression is meaningless’ ’
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 81). In addition, the R-square measure is not valid for all panel
data regression techniques (Buse, 1973). Since the dynamic panel data was used in this
study, R2 test result was not able to justify explicitly how much o f the variation in the
Total Active Duty Personnel number was explained by Military Expenditure, turnover in
the Chief o f General Staff, and modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive.
In order to test goodness-of-fit o f the data set and the Arellano-Bond GMM model a
series o f tests were performed. First, the Arellano-Bond zero autocorrelation test result
proved that there is no autocorrelation, and the data set was a good to fit the ArellanoBond GMM model. Second, the data set needed to be heteroskedastic to fit the ArellanoBond GMM model and the White heteroskedasticity test result proved that the data set
was a good fit with the model. Third, there should be no interaction between one
independent variable and another independent variable or a set o f independent variables,
and the VIF test results proved the data set to fit this requirement. Finally, “There must be

enough cross-sectional units with common points in time to be able to implement the
test” (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006, p. 490). Pesaran’s and Frees’ cross-sectional
independence test proved that the data set had enough cross-sectional units to implement
the test.
4.4

Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses
In Step 2, the data derived from 28 NATO nations was grouped in accordance

with NATO nations’ cultural clusters as shown in Table 21.

Table 21. NATO Nations’ Cultural Clusters

CulturalCls

Cultural
Clusters

NATO Countries (28 Nations)

1

Anglo

USA, Canada, United Kingdom

2

Germanic Europe

Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg

3

Latin Europe

Italy, Spain, Portugal, France

4

Eastern Europe

Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech
Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic

5

Middle East

Turkey

6

Nordic Europe

Denmark, Iceland, Norway

Step 2 evaluated whether the relationship between the Total Active Duty
Personnel number and Military Expenditure (% o f GDP), turnover in the C hief o f
General Staff, and modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive differs across
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cultural clusters. The last three hypotheses out o f six were tested in Step 2. Hypotheses
for Step 2: Cultural Clusters analyses in null form are stated below.
4.4.1

Step 2: Cultural Clusters Hypotheses

H04: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) and personnel
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
H05: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing does
not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Ho6; The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
4.5

Step 2 Analyses
In order to understand the relationship in the six different Cultural Clusters, each

cluster was tested individually. Cultural Cluster 1, 2, 3 and 4 had enough data to test the
hypotheses. However, Cultural Clusters 5 and 6 did not have enough data to run the test.
Stata xtabond' command cannot execute with that amount o f data. Cluster 5 contains
only Turkey as a NATO nation, and the data type turns into time series cross-sectional
dynamic data. Since there was only one nation, there was no panel data specification in
Cluster 5. Cluster 6 consists o f Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. Iceland had no records o f
Active Duty Personnel until 1995, and there was no recorded military expenditure until
2009. It was expected that Cluster 6 would have 276 MS Excel data cells to create a
balanced data set; however, due to missing data, there was only 246 MS Excel data cells.
In order to estimate the test results for Cultural Cluster 5, 6 ANOVA (Analysis o f
variance), and Tukey's HSD (Honest Significant Difference) tests were performed.

Test results for Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo - USA, Canada, and United Kingdom)
are displayed in Table 22. The Stata 'xtabond' estimation was able to run for Cultural
Cluster 1, since there was enough data, and it was still a time series cross-sectional
dynamic panel data. The number o f observations was 57, and the number o f groups
(nations) was three. Three lagged values o f the Total Active Duty Personnel number were
used to observe changes in three consecutive years. Since the Arellano-Bond GMM
model runs with two lagged values o f independent variables to be free from unobserved
parameters and error terms, milex, chiefogs, and nmsd variables were run with their two
lagged values.
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Table 22. Test Results for Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nation n
Number of obs
=
57
Number of groups
Time variable : Year
3
Number of instruments = 57
Obs per group: min
19
avg
19
One-step results
max
19
Wald chi2 (3)
= 2.98e+08
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n)
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
Robust Std.
z
Totaladp
Coef.
Err.
[95% Conf. Interval]
p>|z|
Totaladp
LI.
.8172105
.0630378
12.96
0.000
[.6936587
.9407623]
-.3024334
-5.24
L2.
.0577592
[-.4156394
0.000
-.1892274
L3.
.1817346
.0410879
4.42
0.000
[.1012038
.2622654]
Milex
-5246.058
-0.17
0.862
30105.82
[-64252.37
53760.26]
79280.59
1.54
51395.66
0.123
[-21453.05
180014.2]
LI.
-60678.35
-1.80
L2.
33721.35
0.072
[-126771
5414.281]
Chiefogs
-7834.966
4087.043
-1.92
[-15845.42
0.055
175.4903]
LI.
-605.4976
-0.20
2965.388
0.838
[-6417.551
5206.555]
L2.
-1.18
-1534.895
1306.054
0.240
[-4094.713
1024.924]
Nmsd
1667.653
1.22
1362.833
0.221
[-1003.451
4338.756]
LI.
-4411.167
[-6042.29
832.2207
-5.30
0.000
-2780.044]
3078.029
L2.
1018.964
3.02
0.003
[1080.897
5075.1611
Instruments for differenced equation
____________________________ GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.__________________________

In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo - USA, Canada, and United Kingdom), the National
Military Strategy Directive proved to be statistically significant (p - 0.03). It was found
that one-year o f additional maturity in the National Military Strategy Directive drives an
average 3078 Active Duty Personnel upsizing in this cultural cluster. Military
Expenditure was not significant ip = 0.072) with a negative value. The C hief o f General
Staff was not significant (p = 0.240) with a negative value.
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As displayed in Table 23 there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value o f 0.0895 in Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo).

Table 23. Cultural Cluster 1 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
z
Order
Prob > z
1
-1.5096
0.1312
2
-1.6982
0.0895
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation
Significant at p < 0.05 level.

The test results for Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe - Germany, Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxemburg) are displayed in Table 24.
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Table 24. Test Results for Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Number of obs
=
67
Group variable : nation n
Number of groups
4
Time variable : Year
Number of instruments = 67
Obs per group: min
10
avg
= 16.75
One-step results
max
19
Wald chi2 (3)
= 425.56
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n)
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
Robust Std.
totaladp______ Coef.________Err_________z________p>|z|_______ [95% Conf. Interval]
totaladp
LI.
.3327424
.042139
7.90
0.000
[.2501515
.4153333]
0.64
0.522
.0145992
[-.0192561
.0379716]
L2.
.0093578
0.074
L3.
.0789563
.0442532
1.78
[-.0077783
.165691]
milex
38722.91
-242040.3
-6.25
0.000
[-317935.8
-166144.8]
49143.89
4.48
0.000
LI.
220080.8
[123760.6
316401.1]
-1.17
L2.
-75676.41
64770.1
0.243
[-202623.5
51270.66]
chiefogs
0.849
238.9902
1252.785
0.19
[-2216.422
2694.403]
1883.863
0.82
0.412
[-2147.772
5236.834]
LI.
1544.531
-2.84
L2.
-7379.043
2602.25
0.005
[-12479.36
-2278.726]
nmsd
6642.279
2813.488
2.36
0.018
[1127.943
12156.61]
-0.84
0.399
LI.
-2176.853
2578.506
[-7230.632
2876.925]
L2.
-356.8232
235.6388
-1.51
0.130
[-818.6669
105.02041
Instruments for differenced equation
____________________________ GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.__________________________

In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe - Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxemburg) the Chief o f General Staff was significant (p = 0.05). It was found that one
year o f additional tenure o f the C hief o f General Staff results in, on average, 7329 Active
Duty Personnel downsizing in this cultural cluster. Military Expenditure was not
significant (p = 0.243) with a negative value. The National Military Strategy Directive
was not significant (p = 0.130) with a negative value.
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As displayed in Table 25 there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value o f 0.1999 in Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe).

Table 25. Cultural Cluster 2 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order
z
Prob > z
1
-1.5113
0.1307
0.1999
2
-1.2818
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation
Significant at p < 0.05 level.

The test results for Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe - Italy, Spain, Portugal, and
France) are displayed in Table 26.
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Table 26. Test Results for Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe)

N
Q.

A

Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nation n
Number of obs
=
Time variable : Year
Number of groups
=
Number of instruments = 69
Obs per group: min =
avg
One-step results
max
Wald chi2 (3)
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n)
Prob > chi2
=
Robust Std.
Coef.
Err.
z
totaladp
[95% Conf.
totaladp
21.74
LI.
.7363868
.0338695
0.000
[.6700038
L2.
.1888252
5.64
.0334795
0.000
[.1232065
L3.
-.1333005
.0364787
-3.65
0.000
[-.2047975
milex
90157.08
32409.49
0.005
2.78
[26635.65
45198.19
-90597.82
-2.00
0.045
[-179184.7
LI.
L2.
35330.57
16930.96
2.09
0.037
[2146.499
chiefogs
--.
224.151
947.4665
0.24
0.813
[-1632.849
LI.
476.0159
918.4827
0.52
0.604
[-1324.177
L2.
-1698.778
988.5652
-1.72
0.086
[-3636.33
nmsd
--.
2087.101
749.535
2.78
0.005
[618.0396
LI.
-756.451
532.3849
-1.42
0.155
[-1799.906
L2.
93.69936
460.5669
0.20
0.839
[-808.9952
Instruments for differenced equation
____________________________ GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.__________________________

69
4
15
17.25
19
20.96
0.0000
Interval]
.8027699]
.2544439]
-.0618035]
153678.5]
-2010.989]
68514.63]
2081.151]
2276.209]
238.774]
3556.163]
287.0043]
996.3939]

Results suggest that the relationship between Military Expenditure and the Total
Active Duty Personnel number was significant (p = 0.037) with a negative value in
Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe - Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France). It was found that a
one percent change in Military Expenditure results in 35,330 Active Duty Personnel
upsizing in this cultural cluster. The Chief o f General Staff was not significant {p =
0.086) with a negative value. The National Military Strategy Directive was not significant
(p = 0.839) with a positive value.
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As displayed in Table 27, there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value o f 0.1634 in Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe).

Table 27. Cultural Cluster 3 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order
Z
Prob > z
1
-1.8393
0.0659
2
-1.3937
0.1634
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation
Significant at p < 0.05 level.

Test results for Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe - Poland, Greece, Hungary,
Albania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Slovak Republic) are displayed in Table 28.
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Table 28. Test Result for Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nationn
Number of obs
=
Time variable : Year
Number of groups
=
Number of instruments = 207
Obs per group: min =
One-step results
avg
max
=
Wald chi2 (14)
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n)
Prob > chi2
=
Robust Std.
Err.
totaladp
Coef.
Z
p>|zj
[95% Conf.
totaladp
LI.
.8582053
.0462585
18.55
0.000
[.7675403
.1089189
L2.
.0669068
1.63
0.104
[-.022216
L3.
-.189825
.0284155
-6.68
0.000
[-.2455183
milex
—.
412.7615
3253.354
0.13
0.899
[-5963.696
LI.
5386.039
2211.943
2.43
0.015
[1050.711
L2.
-1792.693
2030.217
-0.88
0.377
[-5771.844
chiefogs
~.
753.9073
565.9253
1.33
0.183
[-355.2859
LI.
1189.473
2.02
587.4175
0.043
[38.15557
-564.5364
L2.
402.2602
-1.40
0.160
[-1352.952
nmsd
—.
1211.686
618.25
1.96
0.050
[-.0618884
LI.
-733.7705
683.0098
-1.07
0.283
[-2072.445
L2.
748.5398
707.6295
1.06
0.290
[-638.3885
Instruments for differenced equation
GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

210
13
11
16.15385
19
3.30e+09
0.0000
Interval!
.9488704]
.2400539]
-.1341316]
6789.219]
9721.367]
2186.459]
1863.1]
2340.79]
223.8792]
2423.434]
604.9041]
2135.4681

In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe - Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania,
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and
Slovak Republic), there was no significant p value for any o f the independent variables.
Military Expenditure was not significant ip = 0.377) with a negative value. The Chief o f
General Staff was not significant (p = 0.160) with a negative value. The National Military
Strategy Directive was not significant ip = 0.290) with a positive value.
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As displayed in Table 29 there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value o f 0.9925 in Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe).

Table 29. Cultural Cluster 4 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order
z
Prob > z
1
-2.2005
0.0278
0.9925
2
.00935
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation
Significant at p < 0.05 level.

Since Stata 'xtabond' estimation cannot test Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) and
6 (Nordic Europe) due to missing data, and Cluster 5 for not carrying panel data
specifications, a series o f comparison tests were performed to investigate any differences
in Cultural Clusters 5 and 6. In the Analysis o f Variance (ANOVA) technique, “the
observations are classified according to their categories for each o f the independent
variables, and the differences between the categories in their mean values on the
dependent variable are estimated and tested for statistical significance” (Porta, 2008, p.
6). However, ANOVA cannot point out the differences within the groups with respect to
each other; it can only specify that two groups are different from each other. In order to
determine the level o f difference between these two groups, Tukey's HSD (honest
significant difference) test, as a post-hoc test, was performed (Laerd Statictics, 2013).
Due to the fact that “Tukey’s HSD uses the difference between the largest and smallest
means as a measure o f their dispersion; and the number o f groups are used as multipliers
o f the standard deviation” (Porta, 2008, p. 160); it is a powerful tool to find out the
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strength o f the difference within groups. The Cultural Cluster 5 ANOVA test results for
Total Active Duty Personnel are depicted in Table 30.

Table 30. Cluster 5 (Middle East) ANOVA Test Results for Totaladp
Number of obs = 620
Root MSE
256587
Partial Sum
of Squares
df
Source
Model
(2.6703e+13)
5
(6.1525e+10)
CulturalClsl
1
CulturalCls2
(6.3169e+12)
1
(2.8541e+12)
CulturalCls3
1
CulturalCls4
(8.1134e+12)
1
CulturalCls6
(7.7228e+12)
1
CulturalCls5
0
0
(4.0424e+13)
614
Residual
Total
(6.7127e+13)
619
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

R-squared
= 0.3978
Adj R-squared = 0.3929
Mean Square
(5.3406e+12)
(6.1525e+10)
(6.3169e+12)
(2.854 le+ 12)
(8.1134e+12)
(7.7228e+12)

F
81.12*
0.93
95.95*
43.35*
123.24*
117.30*

Prob > F
0.0000
0.3341
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

(6.5837e+10)
(1,0844e+11)

There was a significant (p = 0.0001) difference between Cultural Cluster 5 and
Cultural Clusters 2, 3 ,4 , and 6 related to the Total Active Duty Personnel number trends.
However, there was no significant (p = 0.3341) difference between Cultural Cluster 5
(Middle East) and Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) with an F value o f 0.93 with regards to the
Total Active Duty Personnel number.
The Cultural Cluster 6 ANOVA test results for Total Active Duty Personnel are
depicted in Table 31.
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Table 31. Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) ANOVA Test Results for Totaladp
Number of obs = 620
Root MSE
= 256587
Partial Sum
df
Source
of Squares
5
Model
(2.6703e+13)
CulturalClsl
(1.2594e+13)
1
CulturalCls2
(3.0356e+l 1)
1
1
CulturalCls3
(2.9965e+12)
CulturalCls4
1
(1.7379e+l 1)
CulturalCls5
1
(7.7228e+12)
CulturalCls6
0
0
Residual
614
(4.0424e+13)
Total
619
(6.7127e+13)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

R-squared
= 0.3978
Adj R-squared = 0.3929
Mean Square
(5.3406e+12)
(1.2594e+13)
(3.0356e+l 1)
(2.9965e+12)
(1.7379e+l1)
(7.7228e+12)

F
81.12*
191.30*
4.61*
45.51*
2.64
117.30*

Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0322
0.0000
0.1047
0.0000

(6.5837e+10)
(1.0844e+l1)

There was a significant difference between Cultural Cluster 6 and Cultural
Clusters 1, 2, 3, and 5 with p values under 0.05 in Total Active Duty Personnel number
trends. However, there was no significant (p = 0.1047) difference between Cultural
Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with an F value o f
2.64.
In order to determine the quantity o f the difference between Cultural Clusters,
Tukey's HSD (Honest Significant Difference) test was performed as ANOVA post-hoc,
and the results for Total Active Duty Personnel are depicted in Table 32.
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Table 32. Tukey’s HSD Test Results for Total Active Duty Personnel
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters
= 4.0427975
studentized range critical value (.05, 6, 614)
uses harmonic mean sample size
= 60.663
mean dif
grp vs grp
group means
(5.262e+05)
1 vs 2
[6.36e+05 1.10e+05]
(3.341e+05)
1 vs 3
[6.36e+05 3.02e+05]
7.77e+04]
[6.36e+05
(5.581e+05)
1 vs 4
[6.36e+05 6.96e+05]
(59721.3768)
1 vs 5
1 vs 6
[6.36e+05 2.00e+04]
(6.159e+05)
2 vs 3
[1.10e+05 3.02e+05]
(1.921e+05)
(31921.3239)
2 vs 4
[1.10e+05 7.77e+04]
(5.859e+05)
2 vs 5
[1.10e+05 6.96e+05]
2 vs 6
[1.10e+05 2.00e+04]
(89681.3145)
[3.02e+05 7.77e+04]
(2.240e+05)
3 vs 4
3 vs 5
[3.02e+05 6.96e+05]
(3.938e+05)
3 vs 6
[3.02e+05 2.00e+04]
(2.818e+05)
4 vs 5
[7.77e+04 6.96e+05]
(6.178e+05)
[7.77e+04 2.00e+04]
4 vs 6
(57759.9906)
[6.96e+05 2.00e+041
(6.756e+05)
5 vs 6
Note. Asterisk **’ means that the difference between two group was significant.

HSD-test
15.9728*
10.1422*
16.9418*
1.8128
18.6951*
5.8306*
0.9690
17.7857*
2.7223
6.7996*
11.9550*
8.5529*
18.7546*
1.7533
20.5079*

Tukey’s HSD confirmed that there was no significant difference between Cultural
Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for Total Active Duty Personnel
number trend with a value o f 1.8128. The asterisk

sign means that the difference

between the two groups was significant. However, there were significant differences
between Cultural Cluster 5 and Cultural Clusters 2, 3, 4, and 6 for the Total Active Duty
Personnel number trend. Likewise, there was no significant difference between Cultural
Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with a value o f
1.7533. In order to visualize that there was no difference between Cultural Cluster 1
(Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) in Total Active Duty Personnel, the Total
Active Duty Personnel trend for Cultural Cluster 1 vs Cultural Cluster 5 is displayed in
Figure 16.
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Figure 16. Total Active Duty Personnel Cultural Cluster 1 vs Cultural Cluster 5

Even though there were some peaks in the values, Cultural Clusters 1 and 5
showed similar trends in Total Active Duty Personnel numbers.
In order to show that there was no difference between Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic
Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) in Total Active Duty Personnel, the
Total Active Duty Personnel trend for Cultural Cluster 6 vs Cultural Cluster 4 is
displayed in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Total Active Duty Personnel Cultural Cluster 6 vs Cultural Cluster 4

Cultural Clusters 6 and 4 show similar trends in Total Active Duty Personnel numbers.
The ANOVA test results for Military Expenditure are depicted in Table 33.

Table 33. ANOVA Test Results for Military Expenditure
Number of obs = 607
Root MSE
= 1.06921
Partial Sum
Source
of Squares
df
Model
(120.400683)
5
CulturalClsl
(20.875769)
1
CulturalCls2
(19.9711206)
1
CulturalCls4
(.530042774)
1
CulturalCls5
1
(30.3458736)
CulturalCls6
(3.31064764)
1
CulturalCls3
0
0
Residual
(687.065722)
601
Total
(807.466406)
606
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

= 0.1491
R-squared
Adj R-squared = 0.1420
Mean Square
(24.0801367)
(20.875769)
(19.9711206)
(.530042774)
(30.3458736)
(3.31064764)
(1.1432042)
(1.33245281)

F
21.06*
18.26*
17.47*
0.46
26.54*
2.90

Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.4962
0.0000
0.0893
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In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe), there was a significant relationship between
the Total Active Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure (p = 0.037). There was
a significant difference (p = 0.0001) between Cultural Cluster 3 and Cultural Cluster 5
(Middle East) for the Military Expenditure trend; also, diversity was very strong with an
F value o f 26.54. However, there was no significant (p = 0.0893) difference between
Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with an F value
of 2.90 regarding Military Expenditure.
Tukey's HSD test results for Military Expenditure are depicted in Table 34.

Table 34. Tukey's HSD Test Results for Military Expenditure
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters
studentized range critical value (.05, 6, 601)
= 4.0430747
uses harmonic mean sample size
= 58.101
mean dif
grp vs grp
group means
1 vs 2
[2.7171
1.3305]
1.3865
1 vs 3
[2.7171
1.9895]
0.7276
1 vs 4
[2.7171 2.0769]
0.6402
1 vs 5
[2.7171 3.2737]
0.5566
1 vs 6
[2.7171
1.6698]
1.0473
2 vs 3
[1.3305 1.9895]
0.6589
2 vs 4
[1.3305 2.0769]
0.7464
2 vs 5
[1.3305 3.2737]
1.9431
[1.3305 1.6698]
2 vs 6
0.3392
3 vs 4
[1.9895 2.0769]
0.0875
3 vs 5
[1.9895 3.2737]
1.2842
[1.9895 1.6698]
3 vs 6
0.3197
4 vs 5
[2.0769 3.2737]
1.1968
[2.0769 1.6698]
4 vs 6
0.4071
[3.2737 1.66981
5 vs 6
1.6039
Note. Asterisk "*’ means that the difference between two group was significant.

HSD-test
9.8847*
5.1873*
4.5639*
3.9679
7.4664*
4.6973*
5.3208*
13.8526*
2.4183
0.6234
9.1552*
2.2790
8.5318*
2.9025
11.4343*
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Tukey’s HSD confirmed that there was a significant difference between Cultural
Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for the Military
Expenditure trend with a value o f 9.1552. The asterisk

sign means that the difference

between the two groups is significant. However, there was no significant difference
between Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with a
value o f 2.2790 for Military Expenditure.
The ANOVA test results for the Chief o f General Staff are depicted in Table 35.

Table 35. ANOVA Test Results for Chief of General Staff
Number of obs = 621
Root MSE
1.40581
Partial Sum
Source
of Squares
df
Model
(56.8592622)
5
CulturalClsl
(32.0916149)
1
CulturalCls3
(23.673913)
1
CulturalCIs4
(27.7799823)
1
(14.976087)
1
CulturalCls5
1
CulturalCls6
(.316223647)
CulturalCls2
0
0
Residual
(1215.42415)
615
Total
(1272.28341)
620
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

R-squared
= 0.0447
Adj R-squared = 0.0369
Mean Square
(11.3718524)
(32.0916149)
(23.673913)
(27.7799823)
(14.976087)
(.316223647)

F
5.75*
16.24*
11.98*
14.06*
7.58*
0.16

Prob > F
0.0000
0.0001
0.0006
0.0002
0.0061
0.6893

(1.97629943)
(2.05207002)

In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe), there was a significant relationship
between the Total Active Duty Personnel number and the Chief o f General Staff (p =
0.05). There was a significant (p = 0.061) difference between Cultural Cluster 2 and
Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for C hief o f General Staff tenure with an F value of
7.58. However, there was no significant (p = 0.6893) difference between Cultural Cluster
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2 (Germanic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with an F value o f 0.16
with regards to the Chief o f General Staff.
Tukey's HSD test results for the Chief o f General Staff are depicted in Table 36.

Table 36. Tukey's HSD Test Results for Chief o f General Staff
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters
studentized range critical value (.05, 6, 615)
= 4.0427767
uses harmonic mean sample size
= 60.527
grp vs grp
group means
mean dif
1 vs 2
[2.1739 3.0761]
0.9022
1 vs 3
[2.1739 2.3587]
0.1848
1 vs 4
[2.1739 2.4433]
0.2693
1 vs 5
[2.1739 2.1739]
0.0000
1 vs 6
[2.1739 2.9841]
0.8102
2 vs 3
[3.0761 2.3587]
0.7174
2 vs 4
[3.0761 2.4433]
0.6328
2 vs 5
[3.0761 2.1739]
0.9022
2 vs 6
2.9841]
[3.0761
0.0920
3 vs 4
[2.3587 2.4433]
0.0846
[2.3587 2.1739]
3 vs 5
0.1848
3 vs 6
[2.3587 2.9841]
0.6254
4 vs 5
[2.4433 2.1739]
0.2693
4 vs 6
[2.4433 2.9841]
0.5409
5 vs 6
[2.1739 2.98411
0.8102
Note. Asterisk '* ’ means that the difference between two group was significant.

HSD-test
4.9927*
1.0226
1.4906
0.0000
4.4838*
3.9701
3.5021
4.9927*
0.5089
0.4680
1.0226
3.4612
1.4906
2.9932
4.4838*

Tukey’s HSD confirmed that there was a significant difference between Cultural
Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for Chief o f General
Staff tenure with a value o f 4.9927. However, there was no significant difference between
Cultural Cluster 2 and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with a value o f 0.5089 related
to the Chief o f General Staff.

The ANOVA test results for the National Military Strategy Directive are depicted
in Table 37.

Table 37. ANOVA Test Results for National Military Strategy Directive
Number of obs = 621
Root MSE
1.40581
Partial Sum
of Squares
df
Source
(70.7248473)
5
Model
1
CulturalCls2
(10.8787998)
(.85175607)
1
Cu!turalCls3
1
CulturalCls4
(8.11003772)
1
CulturalCls5
(3.63970588)
(3.70594359)
1
CulturalCls6
CulturalClsl
0
0
(2495.34521)
Residual
565
(2566.07005)
Total
570
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

= 0.0447
R-squared
Adj R-squared = 0.0369
Mean Square
(14.1449695)
(10.8787998)
(.85175607)
(8.11003772)
(3.63970588)
(3.70594359)

F
3.20*
2.46
0.19
1.84
0.82
0.84

Prob > F
0.0073
0.1171
0.6607
0.1759
0.3644
0.3600

(4.41654019)
(4.50187729)

In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo), there was a significant relationship between the
Total Active Duty Personnel number and the National Military Strategy Directive (p 0.03). There was no significant (p = 0.3644) difference between Cultural Cluster 1 and
Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for National Military Strategy Directive maturity with an
F value o f 0.82. In addition, there was no significant (p = 0.36) difference between
Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with an F value of
0.82 for the National Military Strategy Directive.
Tukey's HSD test results for the National Military Strategy Directive are depicted
in Table 38.
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Table 38. Tukey's HSD Test Results for National Military Strategy Directive
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters
studentized range critical value (.05,6, 615)
= 4.0427767
uses harmonic mean sample size
= 60.527
grp vs grp
group means
mean dif
1 vs 2
[3.2353 3.7778]
0.5425
1 vs 3
[3.2353 3.0843]
0.1510
1 vs 4
[3.2353 2.8465]
0.3888
1 vs 5
[3.2353 2.7500]
0.4853
0.3339
1 vs 6
[3.2353 3.5692]
2 vs 3
[3.7778 3.0843]
0.6934
[3.7778 2.8465]
0.9313
2 vs 4
2 vs 5
[3.7778 2.7500]
1.0278
2 vs 6
[3.7778 3.5692]
0.2085
0.2379
3 vs 4
[3.0843 2.8465]
[3.0843 2.7500]
0.3343
3 vs 5
0.4849
[3.0843 3.5692]
3 vs 6
[2.8465 2.7500]
4 vs 5
0.0965
4 vs 6
[2.8465 3.5692]
0.7228
[2.7500 3.5692]
0.8192
5 vs 6
Note. Asterisk **’ means that the difference between two group was significant.

HSD-test
1.9203
0.5344
1.3764
1.7178
1.1821
2.4546
3.2967
3.6381
0.7382
0.8420
1.1835
1.7164
0.3414
2.5585
2.8999

There was enough evidence in Tukey’s HSD test to estimate that there was no
significant difference in average maturity o f national military directive between Cultural
Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) based on the p-value o f 1.7178. In
addition, there was no significant difference in average for the National Military Strategy
Directive between Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe)
with a p-value o f 1.1821.
In order to show that there was no difference in average maturity o f National
Military Strategy Directive between Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5
(Middle East), the trends for Cultural Cluster 1 vs Cultural Cluster 5 are displayed in
Figure 18.
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Figure 18. National Military Strategy Directive Cultural Clusters 1 vs 5

In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo), there was a significant relationship between the
Total Active Duty Personnel number and the National Military Strategy Directive (p =
0.03). In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe), the Chief o f General Staff was significant
(p = 0.05). In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe), Military Expenditure was significant (p =
0.037). In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe), there was no significant p value for any o f
the independent variables. In order to better understand the ANOVA & Tukey's HSD test
results investigating the diversity between the dependent variable and the independent
variables across Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe),
overall outputs are depicted in Table 39.

114

Table 39. Overall ANOVA & Tukey’s HSD Test Results

Cultural
Cluster
5
(Middle
East)
Cultural
Cluster
6
(Nordic
Europe)

T u k ey ’s
HSD-

ANOVA

ANOVA

F

Prob > F

26.54**
7.58**
0.82

0.0001
0.0610
0.3644

9.1552**
4.9927**
1.7178

Yes
Yes
No

# 1 & Total Active Duty Personnel

0.93

0.3341

1.8128

No

# 3 & Military Expenditure
# 2 & Chief of General Staff
# 1 & National Military Strategy Directive

2.90
0.16
0.84

0.0893
0.6893
0.3600

2.2790
0.5089
1.1821

No
No
No

# 4 & Total Active Duty Personnel

2.64

0.1047

18.6951

No

C lu ster N um ber & S ignificant V ariable

# 3 & Military Expenditure
# 2 & Chief of General Staff
# 1 & National Military Strategy Directive

D iffers

test

Note. ** Related variable is significantly different.

Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo)
regarding the National Military Strategy Directive and the Total Active Duty Personnel
number. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 3
(Latin Europe) related to Military Expenditure. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) had
similar trends to Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe) with regards to the Chief of
General Staff. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 1
(Anglo) related to the National Military Strategy Directive. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic
Europe) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with regards to the
Total Active Duty Personnel number.
The findings o f Step 2 o f the analyses performed so far lead to further our
understanding o f differences across cultural clusters. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe)
Military Expenditure trend in comparison with the other Clusters is displayed in Table
40.

Table 40. Cultural Cluster 6 Military Expenditure Trend Comparison
Number of obs = 607
Root MSE
= 1.06921
Partial Sum
of Squares
df
Source
(120.400683)
5
Model
1
CulturalClsl
(31.8004731)
(3.72761819)
1
CulturalCls2
CulturalCls3
(3.31064764)
1
CulturalCls4
(7.03599741)
1
1
(40.5260641)
CulturalCls5
CulturalCls6
0
0
Residual
(687.065722)
601
(807.466406)
606
Total
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

R-squared
= 0. 1491
Adj R-squared = 0. 1420
Mean Square
(24.0801367)
(31.8004731)
(3.72761819)
(3.31064764)
(7.03599741)
(40.5260641)

F
21.06*
27.82*
3.26
2.90
6.15
35.45*

Prob > F
0.0000
0.0000
0.0715
0.0893
0.0134
0.0000

(1.1432042)
(1.33245281)

The Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) Military Expenditure trend showed
differences from Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) with a p value o f 0.0001, Cultural Cluster 4
(Eastern Europe) with a p value o f 0.0001, and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) with a p
value o f 0.0134.
Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) Chief o f General Staff data trend in
comparison with the other Clusters is displayed in Table 41.
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Table 41. Cultural Cluster 6 Chief of General Staff Data Trend Comparison
Number of obs = 621
Root MSE
= 1.40581
Partial Sum
Source
of Squares
df
(56.8592622)
5
Model
CulturalClsl
(21.6179811)
1
CulturalCls2
(.316223647)
1
1
CulturalCIs3
(14.6270231)
CulturalCls4
(15.0642541)
1
CulturaICIs5
(11.0603624)
1
CulturalCls6
0
0
Residual
(1215.42415)
615
(1272.28341)
Total
620
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

R-squared
= 0. 0447
Adj R-squared = 0. 0369
Mean Square
(11.3718524)
(21.6179811)
(.316223647)
(14.6270231)
(15.0642541)
(11.0603624)

F
5.75*
10.94*
0.16
7.40*
7.62*
5.60*

Prob > F
0.0000
0.0010
0.6893
0.0067
0.0059
0.0183

(1.97629943)
(2.05207002)

Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) Chief o f General Staff data trend proved to be
different from Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) with a p value o f 0.0067, Cultural
Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with a p value o f 0.0059, and Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) with
a p value o f 0.0010.
Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) National Military Strategy Directive data trend
in comparison with the other clusters is displayed in Table 42.
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Table 42. Cultural Cluster 6 National Military Strategy Directive Data Trend
Comparison
Number of obs = 571
2.10156
Root MSE
Partial Sum
Source
of Squares
df
Model
(70.7248473)
5
(3.70594359)
1
CulturalClsl
1
CulturalCls2
(1.56838778)
1
CulturalCls3
(8.57081883)
CulturalCls4
1
(27.0371883)
1
CulturalCls5
(10.2644796)
CulturalCls6
0
0
Residual
(2495.34521)
565
570
Total
(2566.07005)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.

R-squared
= 0. 0276
Adj R-squared = 0.0190
Mean Square
(14.1449695)
(3.70594359)
(1.56838778)
(8.57081883)
(27.0371883)
(10.2644796)

F
3.20*
0.84
0.36
1.94
6.12*
2.32

Prob > F
0.0073
0.3600
0.5515
0.1641
0.0136
0.1279

(4.41654019)
(4.50187729)

Cultural Cluster 6 ’s (Nordic Europe) National Military Strategy Directive data
trend was found to be different from Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with a p value of
0.0136.
4.5.1

Step 2 Hypotheses Test
In order to test whether the hypothesized relationships between the Total Active

Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure, turnover in the C hief o f General Staff,
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive differs across NATO nations’
cultural clusters, Step 2: Cultural Clusters analyses were performed. Table 43 displays
details about Step 2: Cultural Clusters hypotheses test results.
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Table 43. Step 2: List of Hypotheses and Summary of Findings
Summary of

Hypothesis in
Ha#

Alternative Form
The relationship between
Military Expenditure (% of

Ha4

GDP) and personnel downsizing
differs across NATO nations’
cultural clusters.

Coefficient Value

Findings

In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe)

(p = 0.037)

(35330.57)

Significant

One percent change in Military

with a positive

Expenditure (% of GDP) drives

value

personnel upsizing of 35330 military
personnel.

Supported

In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic
Europe)
The relationship between Chief
Ha5

of General Staff and personnel
downsizing differs across NATO
nations’ cultural clusters.

(-7379.043)
A one-year of additional tenure of
Chief of General Staff drives

National Military Strategy
Ha6

Directive and personnel
downsizing differs across NATO
nations’ cultural clusters.

Significant
with a
negative value

personnel downsizing of 7379
military personnel.

The relationship between the

(p = 0.005)

Supported

In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo)

(p = 0.03)

(3078.029)

Significant

A one-year of additional maturity in

with a positive

the National Military Strategy

value

Directive drives personnel upsizing
of 3078 military personnel.

Supported

In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe), there was no significant p value for any o f
the independent variables. Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) and Cultural Cluster 6
(Nordic Europe) findings were discussed in Chapter 5.
4.6

Validity and Reliability
Validity is the extent to which the measurement and estimation process fits with

the concept and the purpose o f the study (Fawcett & Garity, 2009; Handley, 2014; Last,
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2001). There are two main types o f validity. Internal validity determines if the study is
free from systematic error or bias and to what extent (Porta, 2008). It also determines if
the construct and the data lead the researcher to accurate conclusions based on the
relationships being investigated (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). External validity determines
whether or not the study can be generalized to other populations out o f the scope o f the
present research (Porta, 2008).
Reliability is having dependable results with repeated measurements or
assessments using the same initial conditions (Handley, 2014; Last, 2001).
4.6.1

Validity
In order to gain validity in this study, a draft version o f the research was shared

with experienced colleagues, and their feedback and suggestions were received. Trial
runs were conducted to determine if the model was working properly. During the trial
runs, possible weaknesses o f the research model were tested. The model was modified
subsequently in accordance with the trial performances. Data was collected for 23 years
(1990-2012) annually from 28 NATO nations with the size o f the panels (N = 28 and T =
23) from several data sources. Data triangulation was conducted by verifying data from
different sources. Analyses were performed with a 95% confidential level and a p value
o f 0.05. The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) model was used to
analyze causal relationships between dependent and independent variables by using a
time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data. The Arellano-Bond GMM one-step
difference method with robust standard errors was performed in order to test the
hypotheses in two steps: ‘Step 1: Overall Analyses’ and ‘Step 2: Cultural Clusters
Analyses.’ To ensure that this method was appropriate, a random effect/fixed effect test
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was first performed, and the data proved to fit the fixed effect. Second, the ArellanoBond for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors test was performed to check for
overidentification that helps to clarify whether variables were correlated with residuals or
not and to test for the presence o f exogeneity (Roodman, 2009). There was enough
evidence to conclude that there was no autocorrelation and that independent variables
were exogenous. Third, the White heteroskedasticity test was performed to ensure that
error terms did not exhibit constant variance (Arellano & Bond, 1991), and the model
proved to be heteroskedastic.
The effects o f a change in Military Expenditure, the Chief o f General Staff or the
National Military Strategy Directive on the Total Active Duty Personnel number o f
NATO nations’ armed forces could be observed in the current year, one year later, two
years later, three years later, and so on. The mean value for the turnover in the Chief o f
General Staff was 2.54 years, and for the modification NMSD, it was 3.13 years. Hence,
the lagged values for three (3) years o f the Total Active Duty Personnel number were
calculated (Hamilton, 2006). The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments
(GMM) model uses two lagged values o f independent variables (Arellano & Bond,
1991). In the first lag, the unobserved parameters were gone. In the second lag, the error
terms (the noise) were taken out o f the equation (Drukker, 2008). Hence, two lagged
values o f independent variables were used in the study.
With respect to generalization, the methodology o f this study can be used with
other non-NATO nations for different time intervals, even with different quantitative
independent variables.
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4.6.2

Reliability
In order to gain reliability in this study, expert (advisors and subject matter

experts) opinions were received during the whole process. During the analysis phase of
the study, four statistic experts’ opinions were received, and when they all agreed with
the calculations and outputs o f the current analyses, the following phases were conducted.
Triangulation was performed to check data consistency during data collection by
gathering data from different sources. Even though there was no similar study in military
contexts, the study methodology was compared with similar civilian studies.
Pre-estimation diagnostic and post-hoc tests were performed to test whether the
data set and model match. The same tests were conducted to check for output
consistency. As for the pre-estimation diagnostic tests, a random effect/fixed effect test,
the Arellano-Bond for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors test and the White
heteroskedasticity test were conducted to ensure that the data set fit with the requirements
o f the Arellano-Bond GMM model. As for the post-hoc tests, the interaction between
independent variables test, the Pesaran’s and Frees’ cross-sectional independence test,
and the R-squared test were conducted. The Variance Inflation Factor (V1F) test was
performed to assess whether multicollinearity was a problem or not for independent
variables and, if so, to what extent. There was no implicitly high correlation between an
independent variable and another independent variable or a set o f independent variables.

122

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The purpose o f this study was to investigate key factors that drive personnel
downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations and whether those factors differ
across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. This chapter provides details on the conclusions
o f the study.
The questions for this description are as stated below:
Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military
organizations o f NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
To answer the research questions, a series o f analyses were conducted in two
steps. For the first step (Step 1: overall analyses), an inspection o f the key factors that
drive personnel downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations was analyzed. For
the second step (Step 2: cultural clusters analyses), an analysis was performed to
determine if the key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
5.1

Step 1: Overall Analyses
Table 44 depicts the results o f Step 1: Overall Analyses.
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Table 44. Step 1: Overall Analyses Results
Summary of
Hypothesis in
Ha#

Alternative Form

Findings and
Coefficient Value and Inference
(-6967.631)

Military Expenditure (% of
GDP) has a statistically
Ha 1

significant relationship with
personnel downsizing.

(p = 0.102)

One percent change in Military

Not significant with a

Expenditure (% of GDP) drives

negative value

personnel downsizing of 6967
military personnel.

Ha2

Inference

Not Supported

Turnover in Chief of

(-2306.316)

General Staff has a

A one-year of additional tenure of

Significant with a

statistically significant

Chief of General Staff drives

negative value

relationship with personnel

personnel downsizing of 2306

downsizing.

military personnel.

(p = 0.039)

Supported

(1679.392)
Modification of the National
Military Strategy Directive
Ha3

has a statistically significant
relationship with personnel
downsizing.

A one-year of additional maturity
in the National Military Strategy
Directive drives personnel
upsizing of 1679 military

(p = 0.032)

Significant with a
positive value
Supported

personnel.

Turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was found to be significant, and one year
o f additional tenure o f the Chief o f General Staff proved to drive 2306 Active Duty
Personnel downsizing. This finding showed that turnover in the Chief o f General Staff is
a key factor that drives personnel downsizing in 28 NATO nations’ military
organizations. Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive was found to be
significant; however, one year o f additional maturity in the National Military Strategy
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Directive proved to be driving personnel upsizing o f 1679. Hence, it was determined that
NMSD is not a factor that drives personnel downsizing in military organizations.
Scholars provide evidence o f a relationship between an organization's budget and
personnel downsizing (Prindle, 2005). According to Gardner (2002), “budgets and
politics have directly contributed to downsizing decisions o f the Post-Cold War period”
(p. 41). In 1994, the United States estimated a savings of 40% in military expenditure by
reducing over 30% o f its total active military personnel (Cameron, 1998). The United
States’ military expenditure fell from 5.59% to 3.02% o f its GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) from 1989 through 1999. The total number o f active duty personnel declined by
2.97% (from 2,240,000 to 1,575,000 personnel) during the same period (The World
Bank, 2014). Likewise, daily newspapers generally relate military personnel downsizing
with cuts in military expenditure (Chu, 2010, December 5; France-Presse, 2013,
November 5; Thom & Christopher, 2011, January 7; Times-Herald, 2014, May 2). Even
though the aforementioned facts point to military expenditure as one o f the key factors
that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations, when it comes to NATO
nations, the findings o f this study disagree. Military Expenditure (% o f GDP-Gross
Domestic Product) was found to be statistically non-significant as a factor driving
personnel downsizing in the study. Contrary to general belief and local findings, when 28
NATO nations were considered altogether, Military Expenditure was not a factor that
drives downsizing in military organizations.
All those findings lead the researcher to investigate whether Step 1’s results differ
across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
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5.2

Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses
NATO nations were grouped under cultural clusters with the findings from the

literature as shown in Table 45.

Table 45. NATO Nations by Cultural Clusters
Cultural
Clusters #,
Name

28 NATO Nations

/, Anglo

USA, Canada, United Kingdom
(3 Nations)

2, Germanic
Europe

Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg
(4 Nations)

3, Latin Europe

Italy, Spain, Portugal, France
(4 Nations)

4, Eastern
Europe

Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech Republic,
Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak
Republic
(13 Nations)

5, Middle East

T urkey
(1 Nation)

6, Nordic Europe

Denmark, Iceland, Norway
(3 Nations)

The same method o f statistical analysis was applied to Cultural Clusters 1, 2, 3,
and 4. Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) only contained Turkey, while Cultural Cluster 6
(Nordic Europe) included Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. However, Iceland was missing
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data necessary to the use o f the model. In other words, from a data perspective, Cultural
Cluster 6 had only two nations. The model was constructed to measure time-series crosssectional dynamic panel data, and it was not possible to measure Cultural Clusters 5 and
6 in the model. A series o f comparison tests were performed to investigate the factors that
drive personnel downsizing in Cultural Clusters 5 and 6. Table 46 depicts the results o f
Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses for Cultural Clusters 1-4.

Table 46. Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses Results (CulturalCls 1-4)

h

a#

Ha4

H ypothesis in
A lternative Form

The relationship between
Military Expenditure (%
of GDP) and personnel
downsizing differs across
NATO nations’ cultural
clusters.

Coefficient V alue an d Inference

S um m ary of
Findings an d
Inference

In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe)
(35330.57)
One percent change in Military
Expenditure (% of GDP) drives
personnel upsizing of 35330 military
personnel.

{p = 0.037)
Significant w ith a
positive value

Supported
(p = 0.005)

Ha5

Ha6

The relationship between
Chief of General Staff
and personnel
downsizing differs across
NATO nations’ cultural
clusters.

The relationship between
the National Military
Strategy Directive and
personnel downsizing
differs across NATO
nations’ cultural clusters.

In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe)
(-7379.043)
A one-year of additional tenure of Chief
of General Staff drives personnel
dow nsizing of 7379 military personnel.

Significant w ith a
negative value

Not Supported
(Similar result to
28 NA TO nations)

In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo)

(p = 0.03)

(3078.029)

Significant w ith a

A one-year of additional maturity in the
National Military Strategy Directive
drives personnel upsizing of 3078
military personnel.

positive value

Supported
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In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe), Military Expenditure had a strong
relationship with the Total Active Duty Personnel number; however, it did not prove to
drive personnel downsizing. On the contrary, it proved to be driving personnel upsizing.
This was more likely to happen if Military Expenditure was rising in Cultural Cluster 3,
and the Total Active Duty Personnel number was either rising in parallel or not changing
significantly. In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe), turnover in the Chief o f General
Staff was found to be significant, and one year o f additional tenure o f the Chief of
General Staff drives 7379 active duty personnel downsizing. This finding showed that
turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was a key factor that drives personnel downsizing
in Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe) nations’ military organizations. It yielded
similar results to Step 1: Overall analyses and means that the Chief o f General Staff as a
key factor in 28 NATO nations did not differ in the Germanic Europe cluster. In Cultural
Cluster 1 (Anglo), the National Military Strategy Directive had a strong relationship with
the Total Active Duty Personnel number; however, it did not drive personnel downsizing.
On the contrary, it proved to drive personnel upsizing. In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern
Europe), there was no significant p value for any o f the independent variables. One
potential explanation for the non-existent relationship between the Total Active Duty
Personnel number and the independent variables was that Cultural Cluster 4 was either
missing some identifying data or was not homogenous as a different culture. This cluster
might have some more sub-clusters, or some o f the nations might be members o f other
Cultural Clusters.
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In order to make an estimation o f Cultural Clusters 5 and 6, ANOVA and Tukey’s
Honest Significant Difference tests were performed and displayed in Table 47. The aim
was to find unknown parameters by comparing known parameters.

Table 47. Overall ANOVA & Tukey’s HSD Test Results for Clusters 5 and 6
ANOVA

F

Prob > F

26.54**
7.58**
0.82

0.0001
0.0610
0.3644

9.1552**
4.9927**
1.7178

Yes
Yes
No

# 1 & Total Active Duty Personnel

0.93

0.3341

1.8128

No

# 3 & Military Expenditure
# 2 & Chief of General Staff
# 1 & National Military Strategy Directive

2.90
0.16
0.84

0.0893
0.6893
0.3600

2.2790
0.5089
1.1821

No
No
No

# 4 & Total Active Duty Personnel

2.64

0.1047

18.6951

No

C lu ste r N um ber & Significant V ariable

Cultural
Cluster
5
(Middle
East)
Cultural
Cluster
6
(Nordic

T u k ey ’s
HSD

ANOVA

# 3 & Military Expenditure
# 2 & Chief of General Staff
# 1 & National Military Strategy Directive

Differs

test

Note. ** Related variable is significantly different.

It was found that there was no significant difference between Cultural Cluster 5
(Middle East) and 1 (Anglo) with respect to values o f modification o f the National
Military Strategy Directive and the Total Active Duty Personnel number. However, it did
not necessarily mean that the relationship between the National Military Strategy
Directive and the Total Active Duty Personnel number was almost identical in Cultural
Cluster 1 (Anglo) and 5 (Middle East).
The Total Active Duty Personnel trend was very similar for Cultural Cluster 6
(Nordic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe). Cultural Cluster 6 was a

129

divergent cluster because its Military Expenditure trend was similar to Cluster 3 (Latin
Europe), its trend for turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was similar to Cluster 2
(Germanic Europe), and its trend for modification o f the National Military Strategy
Directive was similar to Cluster 1 (Anglo). However, Cultural Cluster 6 Total Active
Duty Personnel trend was found to be different from Cultural Clusters 2, 3, 1 and 5. The
Cultural Cluster 6 Military Expenditure trend differs from Cultural Clusters 1,4, and 5. It
was anticipated that the Cultural Cluster 6 Chief o f General Staff trend would differ from
Cultural Clusters 3, 4, and 1. It was predicted that the Cultural Cluster 6 National Military
Strategy Directive trend would differ from Cultural Cluster 4. Most likely, those results
were related to the amount o f missing data. It was not possible to estimate which Cultural
Cluster was characteristically similar to Cultural Cluster 6. In conclusion, Cultural
Cluster 6 test results proved that Cultural Cluster 6 was different from 28 NATO nations.
There was enough evidence to conclude that the relationship between Military
Expenditure, turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, modification o f the National Military
Strategy Directive, and personnel downsizing differs across NATO nations’ cultural
clusters.
5.3

Conclusion
It was found that turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was a key factor that

drives personnel downsizing in 28 NATO nations’ armed forces. In contrast,
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive was a key factor that drives
personnel upsizing. On the other hand, reduction in Military Expenditure was generally
declared the reason for military personnel downsizing. In this study, it was found that
Military Expenditure was not a factor that drives Active Duty Personnel downsizing;
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instead, the Chief o f General Staff was found to be the key player. Military expenditure
might have been used as justification for the Chief o f General S taffs downsizing
decisions.
This study showed that the main player in Active Duty Personnel downsizing
implementation is the Chief o f General Staff, neither Military Expenditure, nor NMSD.
Even though Military Expenditure can drive a military organization to downsize, the
Chief o f General Staff can delay or cancel the actual implementation. Even though there
seems to be a sufficient Military Budget to hold all Active Duty Personnel for a certain
period o f time, a C hief o f General Staff may also decide to downsize for other reasons.
However, all these inferences are subject to change when applied to different Cultural
Clusters o f NATO nations. The analysis results o f Step 1 o f this study looked at the
overall NATO group as a whole. However, in one culture, when a Chief o f General Staff
directs his command to perform personnel downsizing o f the Total Active Duty
Personnel number, his / her staff may obey the rules and work very hard to meet the
commander’s order as soon as possible. Inversely, in another culture, the staff may
request to know the rationale o f the personnel downsizing order before implementing the
directive. The staff may request to work on possible risks, mitigations, and opportunities.
In the end, they may either support or not support the Chief o f General S ta ffs decision
by providing detailed rationale. To conclude, it was found that the key factors that drive
personnel downsizing differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
The National Military Strategy Directive might reflect the ideal defense power
that a nation desires to have; however, the Chief o f General Staff, when faced with the
realities o f defense planning with limited resources including personnel and budget,
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might act differently. That might be the reason why NMSD is a key factor in triggering
personnel upsizing rather than downsizing. The Chief o f General Staff might need to find
a rationale for personnel downsizing decisions in order not to be blamed for layoffs and
might use a declining military budget as justification for personnel downsizing. In
agreement with this view, Scott (1998) anticipated that some firms might use poor
economic conditions as a rationale for closing unsatisfactory divisions o f the
organization. In this study, it was found that Chief o f General Staff is the key factor
driving personnel downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations. On the
contrary, the news frequently declares that due to the declining military budget the armed
forces are performing layoffs. For instance, according to an article in the Los Angeles
Times, “There's little doubt that the spending cuts will downgrade armies and arsenals,
which could cause a strain on the United States" (Chu, 2010, December 5, p. 1).
According to an article from Agence Presse, “America will need to scale back the size o f
its armed forces in the face o f deep budget cuts” (France-Presse, 2013, November 5, p.
1). Yet another article from the New York Times expresses that “The White House has
told the Pentagon to squeeze that growth in the next five years, Gates said, reducing by
$78 billion the amount available for the Pentagon, as a result o f this the Army is expected
in 2015 to begin cutting its active-duty troop levels by 27,000, and the Marine Corps by
up to 20,000” (Thom & Christopher, 2011, January 7, p. 4). However, in this study it is
found that Military Expenditure is not a significant factor that drives personnel
downsizing in military organizations. Therefore, the findings in this study support the
idea o f using a decline in Military Expenditure as a justification for personnel
downsizing.
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5.4

Implications
There are a few studies on military downsizing, but none o f them investigated key

factors that drive personnel downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations and
whether or not those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. This time
series cross-sectional dynamic panel data study was the first o f its kind to investigate the
relationship between the Active Duty Military Personnel number and Military
Expenditure, tenure o f the Chief o f General Staff, and the National Military Strategy
Directive maturity. This study was a unique example in military settings, and it may
encourage researchers to work on the factors that drive downsizing in bases, facilities,
hierarchical organizations, work processes, weapon systems, and equipment in military
settings. The methodology used in this military setting was unique, and it can be easily
implemented in civilian settings. This study contributed to our understanding o f a number
o f key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations
and whether or not those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The
findings from this research contribute to the discipline o f engineering management by
providing a model to improve our understanding and ability to predict future personnel
downsizing decisions and to increase our understanding o f military governance not only
NATO wide but also worldwide. The findings may also set off a series o f publicly shared
military downsizing studies. Cultural diversity was found to affect the decision making
process in military downsizing. Findings on cultural diversity make this study more
significant. Researchers from other nations can repeat this study by using their own data
to investigate what lies behind military downsizing in their regions and organizations.
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This study filled a gap in the literature about the factors that drive personnel
downsizing in military organizations and how they differ across cultural clusters. In
addition, there was no previous study on how influential factors may differ across NATO
nations’ cultural clusters. This study relied on prior literature on cultural differences to
assign 12 NATO nations to existing cultural clusters since those nations were not
included in the GLOBE study (Chnokar et al., 2009). The modification o f NATO nations’
cultural clusters may encourage researchers to update the GLOBE findings by adding
missing NATO nations. The same methodology can be used in civilian settings in
different business disciplines using time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data. The
study showed that NATO nations in Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe - Poland, Greece,
Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic) may need to be further explored to investigate
whether some o f the nations were culturally similar to other cultural clusters or if there
were other sub-cultural clusters among Cultural Cluster 4 nations.
Since this study found the C hief o f General Staff to be the key factor that drives
downsizing in NATO nations’ armed forces, it might also mean that the main factor in
military organizations is human. Whatever the organization is, whatever the
organizational strategy guides, it is up to us, human beings, to decide when and what to
do when it comes to personnel downsizing. In order to better understand personnel
downsizing decisions, it is critical to identify the most significant factor that affects final
decision. One o f the key factors in personnel downsizing decisions might be to influence
the CEO or the Chief o f General Staff for the ones who seek to get the desired results for
personnel downsizing decisions.
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This study also proved that NATO clusters differ with respect to the approach
they take to downsizing decisions. The drivers o f downsizing decisions were different
across NATO cultural clusters.
Military culture can be also seen as coexisting with national culture and creating a
different subculture within the overall national population. One o f the reasons might be
that NATO as an organization forms a culture o f its own, and the national personnel
experienced in NATO might have reached a level o f mutual understanding, sharing
values and beliefs with other NATO nations’ military personnel. The purposes, goals,
training methods, and decision-making processes might be similar enough to create a
NATO culture among NATO nations’ armed forces.
5.5

Limitations o f the Study
There are no previous studies that specifically search for the factors that drive

personnel downsizing in military organizations. The data and analysis methods used in
the research design are limited in certain areas. With respect to data, there was some
missing data because some NATO nations gained independence after 1990, and there
were no established armed forces or recorded data for some o f the NATO nations for a
certain period o f time. Some o f the missing data by nation and year is as follows: Albania
1990-1991, Croatia 1990-1991, Czech Republic 1990-1992, Estonia 1990-1991, Iceland
1990-1994, Latvia 1990-1992, Lithuania 1990-1992, Slovak Republic 1990-1992, and
Slovenia 1990-1991 (The World Bank, 2014). With respect to the analyses, the study
focused on quantitative indicators for the most influential factors as identified in the
previous literature. Qualitative factors and less influential factors were out o f the scope o f
this study for feasibility purposes. Downsizing in NATO nations’ armed forces is a
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highly complex phenomenon, and it is hard to find out what really lies behind
downsizing. The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) cannot run
with relatively little or missing data (Arellano & Bond, 1991). This is the reason why it
was not possible to identify the factors for Cultural Clusters 5 and 6. Originally, 12
NATO nations were not a part o f the GLOBE study with respect to Cultural Clusters. It
was possible to include missing nations in groups by researching relationships. However,
an educated assumption had to be made by considering the modified Cultural Clusters in
this study. Three lagged values o f Total Active Duty Personnel were calculated in the
model.
Strategies o f downsizing, types o f downsizing, the management o f a downsizing
process, the decision making process o f downsizing, the pros and cons o f downsizing, the
question o f whether or not downsizing is good or bad for the health o f an organization,
the question o f whether an organization should downsize or not, rightsizing o f an
organization, the risks o f downsizing, the causes o f downsizing, and the effects of
downsizing were out o f the scope o f this study since they were not directly related to the
investigation o f the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations.
Hence, literature on the aforementioned areas was not reviewed in this study.
Data was collected from 28 NATO countries between the years o f 1990-2012 (a
span o f 23 years) to work specifically on these countries. To maintain the feasibility o f
this study, the number o f years devoted to research was limited to 23. Other possibly
related populations were not considered because it was not feasible to work on all o f the
countries around the world fo ra limitless period o f time. National Instability can be
defined as the fluctuation or irregularity o f a NATO nation before, after, or during a war,

136

crisis, military operation, or an extreme event such as joining NATO (Future Atlas,
2014). During National Instability periods, the Total Active Military Personnel number
and Military Expenditure o f a NATO nation might fluctuate and affect the data. The
possible effects o f National Instability periods on the data were not taken into
consideration because data for this variable were not available.
S.6

Suggestions for Further Research
The same methodology used in this study could be applied in different ways.

First, it could be applied to different armed forces and different cultural clusters to
understand the effects o f cultural diversity on military personnel downsizing actions.
Second, it could be used in civilian settings in different business disciplines to determine
whether CEOs are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing. Finally, the same
methodology used in this study could be applied to qualitative and less influential factors
(e.g. downsizing in hierarchical structure, closing facilities or bases, training,
developments in information technologies, buying new warfare systems or
modernization) that could drive personnel downsizing.
With respect to cultural clusters, further research needs to be conducted. This
study made an assumption by locating into suitable Cultural Clusters 12 NATO nations
that were not covered in the GLOBE study. First, a study to update the GLOBE findings
by adding missing NATO nations needs to be conducted. Second, a subculture study
considering NATO nations’ military personnel culture could be performed. Finally, with
a motto o f ‘cultural transformation’, an investigation to determine if any nation from the
current GLOBE findings moved to another cultural cluster could be performed.
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The key factors that drive decisions about military units, equipment, weapon
systems, or facilities and bases downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations, and
whether those factors differ across NATO nations' cultural clusters could be studied for
further research.
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APPENDIX

A variety o f data sources were used to collect data on 28 NATO nations’ armed
forces. Data sources for each variable are listed below.
Data sources for Total Active Duty Personnel
NATO nations’ armed forces official webpages, (The World Bank, 2014),
(NATO, 2013, August 20)
Data sources for Military Expenditure
(The World Bank, 2014), (SIPRI, 2013), (SIPRI, 2014), (US ACDA, 1995)
Data sources for Chief o f General Staff
National Liaison Representatives (NLRs) o f 28 NATO nations working
collaboratively with Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ
SACT), NATO nations’ armed forces official webpages, (The World Bank, 2014),
(NATO, 2013, August 20), (Bundeswehr, 2011), (Turkish Armed Forces, 2014, May 22)
Data sources for National Military Strategy Directive
National Liaison Representatives (NLRs) o f 28 NATO nations working
collaboratively with Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ
SACT), NATO nations’ armed forces official webpages, (NATO, 2013, August 20),
(Albanian Parliment, 2005), (Tagarev, 2003), (DCAF, 2003), (EU Security and Defence
Affairs, 2011), (Bumci, 2003), (Ciocoiu, 2004), (Bundeswehr, 2011), (Global Security,
2014c), (Hesterman, 2014), (French MOD, 2013), (Turkish Armed Forces, 2014, May
22), (Iceland Governmental Committee, 1993), (EU Security and Defence Affairs, 2011),
(MERLN, 2014), (Estonian MOD, 2014), (ISN, 2014), (Matei, 2011), (Paoletti, 2007),

(Camillo & Marta, 2009), (Latvian MOD, 2014), (CSIS, 2002), (e-Luxembourg, 2007),
(Blom, 2002), (Carreiras, 2007), (Soare, 2008), (Ciocoiu, 2004)
Data sources for Cultural Clusters
(Chnokar et al., 2009; Robert J. House & Javidan, 1999), (Chhokar et al., 2013),
(Randburg, 2014), (Bakacsi et al., 2002)p.l), (Hampden-Tumer & Trompenaars, 2000),
(Laurent, 2011), (House, 2004), (Essays UK, 2013c), (Essays UK, 2013a), (Bunkse &
Tietze, 1994), (Kohl, 2008), (Russo, 2000), (Stoltenberg, 2009)
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